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Into the Third Era of Administrative Law:
An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's
Retreat from Chevron Principles in United
States v. Mead
Eric R. Womack*
I.

Introduction

Administrative law scholars often refer to two eras of deference in
administrative law: the pre-Chevron/Skidmore era and the Chevron era.1
The Skidmore v. Swift and Co.2 and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3 decisions are taught as the primary
decisions of public law, and they are often compared against one another
to show the various standards the Supreme Court has used over the years
in dealing with the question of deference to agency interpretations.4 In
what can only be referred to as a silent counterrevolution, the primary
caselaw in administrative scholarship has now been expanded into a
trilogy with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mead
* Law Clerk for Judge James Turk of the Western District of Virginia. J.D., cum
laude, N.Y.U. School of Law, 2002; B.A., magna cum laude, Georgetown University.
The author would like to thank Bill Nelson for his continued advice and support, and
Judge Robert Katzmann for his guidance and helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within
the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105 (2001) (finding a role for
Skidmore deference within the Chevron era); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of
Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327 (2000) (analyzing
the Chevron era as a dramatic break with the Skidmore era); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83 (1994) (analyzing the impact of Chevron
by comparing it with the Skidmore era of cases); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990)
(comparing Chevron with the prior era in which only Skidmore is cited).
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See sources cited supra note 1. Although it is difficult to document the content
administrative law classes in law schools throughout the nation, most scholars would
agree that no class would be complete without a comprehensive review of the Skidmore
and Chevron decisions.
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Corp.5 Although little has yet been written on the case, it may someday
be understood to have been just as dramatic a shift as the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Chevron.
In Mead, the Supreme Court established a new test for judicial
deference to agency interpretations of statutes that includes within its
larger framework the Skidmore and Chevron tests.7 The test focuses on
delegation of authority from Congress through the lawmaking powers of
the agency and the procedural protections that an agency has provided in
promulgating an interpretation. 8 If the agency action meets the Mead
test, and thus has the "force of law," the agency action receives Chevron
deference. 9
As observers of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence are
aware, the test constructed in Mead could have served as merely another
example of the Supreme Court's disapproval of an agency exercising
congressionally delegated lawmaking authority in an informal action,
such as an opinion letter, ruling letter, or amicus brief.10 However, the
language and purpose of Mead has had an impact far beyond merely
cementing a line of precedent. Rather, recent history suggests that Mead
may represent a fault line in administrative law.
A study of cases citing the Mead decision only six months after its
publication indicates that the decision has already had a significant
impact on the lessons of Chevron. Most significantly, Mead removes the
determinacy of the Chevron test and weakens the presumption of judicial
deference to agency interpretations. 1" This result has been due in large
part to the rebirth and transformation of the Court's Skidmore inquiry
into de novo review of agency decisionmaking, leaving little of the
traditional persuasiveness inquiry for agencies to use in arguing for
deference from the courts. 12

5.
6.

533 U.S. 218 (2001).
In a LexisNexis search in the combined law reviews database on May 15, 2002,

only five articles appear. Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme
Court and the Business-Related Cases on Its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TULSA L.J. 305
(2001); John 0. McGinnis, PresidentialReview as ConstitutionalRestoration, 51 DUKE
L.J. 901 (2001); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DuKE L.J. 1015 (2001); Alan E. Sorcher &
Satish M. Kini, Does the Term "Bank Broker-Dealer" Still Have Meaning?, 6 N.C.

BANKING INST. 227 (2002); Todd J. Zywicki, The Law of PresidentialTransitionsand the
2000 Election, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1573. Only the Duke Law Journalsymposium articles
are related to administrative law, and they deal only in passing with the Mead decision.
7. See infraPart II.C.2.
8. See infraPart II.C.2.
9. See infra Part II.C.2.
10.
11.

See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part III.B.

12.

See infra Part III.B.
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This result may have far-ranging implications for agencies in the
near future, for evidence indicates that few agency decisions have been
upheld post-Mead when issued in an informal format.' 3 What is already
apparent is the significant shift in approach that Mead demands of courts
in this new era. While the ability to predict future trends is limited by the
timeframe of this study, one unmistakable result has been short-term
confusion on the part of courts in applying the test.
The reason behind the jurisprudential shift by the Supreme Court is
difficult to understand from the limited viewpoint of administrative law
scholars who support wide deference to agency actors. However,
looking from the broader standpoint of the relationship among the
branches of power and the growing power of agencies in an era of
increasing deference in the context of statutory ambiguity, it is possible
to discern the nondelegation principles underlying the Supreme Court's
decision in Mead. Because of the declining use and force of the
nondelegation doctrine, 14 the Supreme Court has chosen to limit the
scope of Chevron and refocus the inquiry into congressional intent in
order to limit unprincipled deference and delegation to agencies that can
exercise such power without sufficient procedural protections.
Part II of this Article will examine the three eras of deference in
administrative law, beginning with Skidmore, continuing through15
Chevron, and ending in the present with Christensen v. HarrisCounty
and Mead. This part will describe the revolutionary aspects that made
each decision such an important part of administrative scholarship and
explain how these revolutionary aspects have been limited or reversed by
the Mead decision. Part III will examine the practical effects of Mead,
looking at evidence found in court decisions citing Mead and comparing
these results to court decisions prior to the shift in eras beginning with
Christensen. This part will discuss the impact of Mead in reversing the
two most important effects of the Chevron decision: determinacy and a
background presumption of deference to agency interpretations. Part IV
will conclude with a brief attempt to understand the Supreme Court's
reason for shifting away from the test of Chevron deference to a test that
is much less deferential to agency decisionmaking.

13.

See infra Part III.B.

14.
15.

See infranote 256 and accompanying text.
529 U.S. 526 (2001).
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II.

Three Eras of Deference

A.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 16
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In 1944, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that would
come to characterize the first true era of deference in the burgeoning
administrative state. Skidmore dealt with a complaint filed by seven
employees of the Swift and Company packing plant in Fort Worth,
Texas, seeking to recover overtime, liquidated damages, and attorneys'
fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 17 The crux of the
decision was whether the employees' time spent waiting for fire alarms
should be considered overtime for purposes of compensation under the
FLSA.18 The district court and appellate court were confident that this
question was purely one of law, and both courts held that the time the
plaintiffs spent in the fire hall did not "constitute hours worked, for
which overtime compensation [was] due them."'19 The Supreme Court
disagreed, doubting that any legal formula could actually be applied to
every overtime case, as the result will ultimately depend on facts to be
discovered on a case-by-case basis.2 ° While this inquiry is within the
discretion of the trial court, the Supreme Court identified a source that
could help guide this inquiry: the office of Administrator of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("Administrator"). 2'
Before analyzing the precise amount of deference provided to
interpretations of agency officials such as the Administrator, the Court
recognized on an initial basis that interpretative bulletins and informal
rulings serve as "practical guides to employers and employees"
concerning how the Administrator would interpret and enforce the Act.22
The bulletin at issue, which related to overtime compensation, 23 was a

16.

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

17.
18.

Id. at 135.
Id.

19.

Id. at 136.

20. Id. at 136-37 (stating that the trial court is responsible for the initial factual
inquiry). The Court clearly stated the nature of this factual inquiry:
[It] involves scrutiny and construction of the agreements between the particular
parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the working agreement by
conduct, consideration of the nature of the service, and its relation to the
waiting time, and all of the surrounding circumstances. Facts may show that
the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be
engaged.
Id. at 137.
21. Id. at 137-38.
22. Id. at 138.
23. See id. at 138 (citing WAGE & HOUR Div., DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERPRETATIVE
BULLETIN No. 13 (1939)).
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perfect example of the practical utility of the Administrator's bulletins.
The overtime bulletin provided flexible tests and examples that could be
applied on a case-by-case basis to determine the overtime compensation
due an employee.24 While the particular facts of Skidmore did not fall
into any of these examples, the Administrator had expressed its opinion
in an amicus curiae brief that the hours the seven employees had spent
sleeping and eating should not be counted for purposes of overtime, but
that all other time should be included.25
In deciding between two equally valid interpretations and loci of
decisionmaking power-the district court in its role as fact finder and the
office of the Administrator in its role as expert agency 26 -the Supreme
Court set forth the well-known sliding scale test of deference to agency
decision-making:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to
27
persuade, if lacking power to control.

24. Id. (stating the Administrator's opinion in the bulletin that "the answer [to
overtime compensation in each individual case] depends 'upon the degree to which the
employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when he is
subject to call and the number of consecutive hours that the employee is subject to call
without being required to perform active work').
25. Id. at 139.
26. Id. at 137. The Court recognized that Congress placed the responsibility to find
facts in cases falling under the FLSA on the courts. Id. However, this understanding of
the institutional role of the courts in interpreting agency decision-making is balanced and
perhaps outweighed by the Court's belief that the agency deserves at least a certain
degree of deference. The Court discusses three apparent reasons for deference to agency
decision-making. Id. at 137, 139-40. First, the Court mentions an institutional/separationof-powers basis for deference, in that Congress created "the office of Administrator,
impose[d] upon him a variety of duties, endow[ed] him with powers.., and put on him
the duties of bringing injunction actions to restrain violations." Id. at 137. For the
second basis of deference, the Court mentions the expertise rationale. Id. The agency
has considerably more experience than the courts in interpreting the FLSA and therefore
has a greater understanding of what custom should prevail in governing overtime
standards in the majority of situations. Id. This expertise is even more important when
one considers the greater institutional capacity of the agency in having the resources and
manpower to investigate violations of the Act. Id. at 139. Finally, the Court mentions an
efficiency rationale for deference. Agency decisions cannot establish bright-line rules for
affected businesses and individuals to follow in deciding on a particular course of
conduct if the agency rules are constantly being second-guessed by the courts. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 140.
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Due to the fact-specific nature of the analysis involved in the test, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court28 for further
proceedings to take into account the agency's interpretation.
As a quick look at the language of the test cited in Skidmore could
predict, the only certain result of the Supreme Court's decision was the
resulting uncertainty. 29 Critics of Skidmore deference have decried the
test as vague and indeterminate, leaving an immense amount of
discretion in the hands of trial (or appellate) judges.3 ° In fact, so much
discretion lay in the hands of judges post-Skidmore that the test of
deference articulated by the Supreme Court seemed to sanction granting
no deference at all. 3 '
However, this indeterminacy was not necessarily a bad result, nor
should it have been a particularly surprising one. In Skidmore, the
Supreme Court was struggling with the tension between the judiciary's
traditional role of providing review and engaging in fact-finding and the
agency's institutional role and expertise. 32 These competing roles led the
Court to a middle ground that, while reasonable, did not allow the Court
to establish a bright-line standard of review.33 Thus, in the forty years

28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 93 (describing the APA doctrine in the
post-Skidmore era as "schizophrenic"); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969, 972 (1992) ("Prior to 1984, the Supreme Court
had no unifying theory for determining when to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes. The approach was instead pragmatic and contextual."); Anthony, supra note 1,
at 14 ("Reliance on such a process of weighing multiple and perhaps incommensurable
factors can yield unpredictable results and unsure doctrine.... The courts compounded
the pre-Chevron uncertainty. .. through imprecise and inconsistent language.").
30. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 336 (describing Skidmore deference as a rule of
"variable deference"); Merrill, supra note 29, at 972 (locating the logic of the sliding
scale Skidmore approach in the establishment of a default rule of "independent judicial
judgment" and stating that "[d]eference to the agency interpretation was appropriate only
if a court could identify some factor or factors that would supply an affirmative
justification for giving special weight to the agency views"); Anthony, supra note 1, at 13
(describing how, under "Skidmore consideration," the actual location of final decision
making power "remains with the court").
31. See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 88 (describing the application of Skidmore
deference by the courts: "Reviewing courts ... stressed that the decision regarding
deference, and the ultimate responsibility for interpreting the statute, remained theirs. In
many instances, courts chose to decipher statutes without any attention to, let alone
deference to, prior agency interpretations."); Anthony, supra note 1, at 13.
32. See supra note 17-28 and accompanying text.
33. Professor Seidenfeld describes the tension inherent in the Skidmore test as the
result of the "amalgam" of.the formalist and expertise models within the traditional
model at work in Skidmore. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 92. Under the traditionalist
model, there is a tension between the judiciary as the ultimate authority in interpreting a
statute (formalist) and the idea of the agency as the body best suited for legislative
policysetting (expertise). See id. at 92-93. Due to this tension, Skidmore deference could
only be an identifiable "test" for deference on paper. See id. at 93.
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following Skidmore, courts relied on a number of factors that, if found,
support or lessen the need for judicial review. 34 Whether these factors
were those suggested by the Court in Skidmore or those that were
separately developed by lower courts, the result was to increase
confusion in the application of Skidmore deference, particularly because
courts could pick and choose among these factors. 35 Even when a court
had made a decision about the factors that supported or weakened the
basis for deference, the deference that the court applied rested on a
sliding scale from none to complete and often fell in-between.3 6
Because of this confusion, Skidmore can truly be said to mark the
first era of administrative deference only in its vague application of
individual standards to determine the degree of deference required to be
given to agency interpretations. Skidmore marked the beginning of a
morass of judicial power in deferring to agencies that cried out for
clarity. The need for a unifying standard was finally recognized by the
Supreme Court in 1984 when it issued the landmark decision in
Chevron.37 This decision represented a dramatic shift in the language of
the Supreme Court in favor of deference to agency decisionmaking.
B.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Chevron concerned the EPA's interpretation of the definition of
"stationary source" under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.38 A
1981 EPA regulation allowed businesses to adopt a plant-wide definition
of the term, thus permitting modifications or installations of equipment
in a polluting plant to avoid the permit requirements of the Clean Air Act
34. The Skidmore factors, enumerated in the Skidmore test, include the thoroughness
evident in the agency's consideration, the validity of its reasoning, and its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The
last part of the Skidmore test-"all those factors which give power to persuade, if lacking
power to control"-gave courts room to add a number of other factors, including, but not
limited to, whether "an agency's rule 'flatly contradicted' its prior rule, was of recent
vintage, or concerned a non-technical area within the court's expertise." Hasen, supra
note 1, at 334; see also Anthony, supra note 1, at 14 ("Under Skidmore, the weight given
the agency interpretation, and the ultimate determination to adopt it as correct or to
overturn it, usually depend on a variety of circumstances or 'factors,' such as the
importance of agency expertise, contemporaneity of the interpretation with enactment of
the statute, longstanding application and consistency of the agency interpretation, the
possibility of congressional acquiescence, and numerous others."); Merrill, supra note 29,
at 973-74 (listing and describing three broad categories of "pre-Chevron deference
factors").
35. See supra notes 30, 34 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 29, at 972 ("One feature of the Court's practice was
that deference could range over a spectrum from 'great' to 'some' to 'little' (although no
attempt was ever made to calibrate different degrees of deference with any precision).").
37. 467 U.S. 837.
38. Id. at 840.
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Amendments as long as the modifications did not increase the overall
amount of pollution emitted. 39 The National Resources Defense Council
challenged this interpretation as unreasonable, contending that polluting
plants had to meet the new permit requirements any time modifications
to a single piece of equipment were made.4 °
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the
EPA's regulations, stating that, on the basis of prior decisions, the EPA's
single stationary source definition was incompatible with the purpose of
the Amendments-to increase air quality. 41 This decision was reached
after the court recognized that the Clean Air Act did not explicitly define
"stationary source" and that the issue was not addressed in the legislative
42
history of the Act.
1.

The Supreme Court's Chevron Standard of Judicial Deference
to Agency Actions

In overturning the court's decision, the Supreme Court established
the two-part test that has come to be the standard for judicial review of
agency decisionmaking:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible
43
construction of the statute.
Under the first step of the Chevron analysis, the reviewing court
looks at the language of the statute that the agency is interpreting, and
attempts to determine whether Congress has "directly spoken" to the
question at issue. 44 This first part of the test was written in sweepingly
broad language by the Court. Under this step, a court's ability to
contradict agency decisionmaking rests on a finding of "direct" or

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id. at 842-43.
Id.
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"unambiguous" intent.45 The ability of an agency to speak absent an
express intent of Congress gives the agency wide discretion due to the
low likelihood that Congress will ever speak with unambiguous intent on
a particular issue being litigated before a court.46 Unlike in Skidmore,
where the Court recommended a balancing of factors in determining the
level of deference to grant, the Supreme Court in Chevron based
deference on the fiction that Congress has delegated to the agency the
authority to speak in absence of language to the contrary. 47 This
rejection of a balancing test can be seen in the Court's view of agency
45. See id.; see also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 625-26
(1996) (describing the presumption established in Chevron that silence in a statute shows
the intent of Congress to leave the act of interpretation in the hands of the agency in
charge of administering the act). The requirement of unambiguous or direct intent is
premised on the belief that Congress speaks through silence. In other words, when a gap
exists in a statute that requires an interpretive leap, Congress has made a conscious
decision to allow an agency to resolve the gap.
46. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: SeparatingInterpretationand
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. LAW J. OF AM. U. 187, 196 (1992) ("Chevron
deference does not reflect the agency's ability to determine the one correct meaning of a
statute. Rather, its premise is that no such thing exists. The agency is not clarifying
Congress' decision, it is making the decision itself. Whether by congressional direction,
superior accountability, or technical expertise, such lawmaking, holds Chevron, must be
left to the agency."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2087-88 (1990) ("Chevron is best understood and defended as a
frank recognition that sometimes interpretation is not simply a matter of uncovering
legislative will, but also involves extratextual considerations of various kinds, including
judgments about how a statute is best or most sensibly implemented."). Professor
Sunstein notes several problems that expose the fiction of legislative omniscience and
weigh in favor of an administrative solution, including, among others, the fact that the
"excessive rigidity of statutory commands" prevents Congress from foreseeing all
problems that require a legislative solution. Id. at 2089.
This broad reading of the presumption of deference granted to the agencies in the
first part of the Chevron test is bolstered by the Court's statutory interpretation of the
Clean Air Act in Chevron. The Court refused to allow general terms to evince
congressional intent in limiting the scope of deference:
We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will
reveal an actual intent of Congress. We know full well that this language is not
dispositive; the terms are overlapping and the language is not precisely directed
to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context of a larger
operation. To the extent that any congressional "intent" can be discerned from
this language, it would appear that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms
was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the agency's power
to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861-62.
47. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see Rossi, supra note 1, at 1114 (describing
explicit and implicit delegation by Congress that existed in the gaps in statutory language
in Chevron); Manning, supra note 45, at 626 (noting the Supreme Court's decision to
leave the decision over competing interests that exist in statutory ambiguities to the
agency); Herz, supra note 46, at 196; Merrill, supra note 29, at 978 (describing the
democratic theory basis for judicial deference to agency decisionmaking).
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flexibility as a positive attribute
to be encouraged, rather than a factor
48
weighing against delegation.
The second part of the two-part test articulated in Chevronpermissible construction of the statute-seems of less importance to
commentators and judges reviewing agency decisionmaking. 49 Once a
court reads a gap in a statute to constitute an implied delegation of
decisionmaking authority by Congress to an agency, the court will rarely,
if ever, reject the agency's decision as impermissible or arbitrary and
capricious. 50 Thus, if the first step of the Chevron inquiry is read by
courts to the broadest extent of interpretation permissible under the
language used in Chevron, agencies could actually be deemed to be
placed in an institutional position above the judiciary in the realm of
statutory decisionmaking and interpretation. 5'
Whether the Chevron decision was a revolutionary decision in
practice or in form only has been a hot topic in the academic literature
for years.52 Certain critics of the Chevron decision argue that the
48. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64 ("The fact that the agency has from time to
time changed its interpretation of the term 'source' does not, as respondents argue, lead
us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the
statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary,
the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and
the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.").
49. See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 96 ("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is
deferential or active, once it reaches step two it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as
unreasonable. As Judge Stephen Williams suggests, an agency interpretation fails the
reasonableness test 'only when it would flunk the laugh test at the Kennedy School of
Public Policy."').
50. Id.
51. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2229 (1997) (recognizing that, after Chevron, "agencies are in a position below
Congress but above courts in the institutional hierarchy in the policymaking context").
52. Compare Pierce, supra note 51, at 2227 ("The Court's opinion in Chevron ....
is one of the most important constitutional decisions in history ....
"),and Seidenfeld,
supra note 1, at 83 ("The Chevron 'two-step' has revolutionized judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation."), and Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2075 ("[Chevron] has
established itself as one of the very few defining cases in the last twenty years of
American public law.... Chevron has altered the distribution of national powers among
courts, Congress, and administrative agencies."), with Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1257-58 (1997)
("Regardless of what the Court originally intended, however, we now know that
experience has not borne out the early predictions of a sea change in judicial deference.
A strong revisionist view has emerged, interpreting Chevron as less deferential than
many initially assumed."), and Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives
and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J.
1051, 1052 (1995) (describing how the test in Chevron has "broken down" due to the
actions of lower courts and the Supreme Court), and Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Eliott,
To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984 (1990) (describing, in an empirical study, how courts eventually found a means
of getting around the mandates of the test in Chevron). See generally Merrill, supra note
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decision did not actually change the way that courts reviewed agency
decisionmaking, as empirical studies have suggested that agency
decisions were not affirmed to any greater degree after Chevron than in
the Skidmore era of deference.53
Putting this debate aside for a moment, there are at least two
principles to be derived from the Chevron decision that mark a definitive
change from the standards of the previous era. First, in Chevron, the
Supreme Court created a determinative test that, at least procedurally,
appears to be a simpler inquiry for courts to follow in a consistent
manner than the procedure followed in the Skidmore inquiry. 54 Rather
than hunting through a mess of context-specific factors, courts under
Chevron may simply use the traditional tools of statutory interpretation
to determine whether Congress has spoken on the precise issue in
question.55 If so, then the court may decide the issue; if not, then the
court must defer to the agency.56
This simplicity in form obviously runs only skin deep, and the
wealth of literature on the Chevron test shows the enormous complexity
of the inquiry. 57 However, the formalism of the test was a vast
29 (finding a middle ground in this debate by describing three significant, but not
revolutionary, implications of the Chevron decision).
53. See generally Shapiro & Levy, supra note 52; Schuck & Eliott, supra note 52.
54. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 336 ("In comparison with the Skidmore rule of
variable deference, Chevron's formalism vastly simplified the inquiry reviewing courts
were to conduct."). Regardless of the empirical debate over the true impact of Chevron
in limiting judicial discretion, a close look at the Skidmore and Chevron tests shows that,
at least on its face, the Chevron inquiry was designed to be a true test that required judges
to follow certain steps in coming to a decision. This formalism represents, at least on its
face, a significant departure from the general reasonableness inquiry of Skidmore, in
which the Supreme Court merely suggested particular factors that judges could consider
in coming to a particular result. In practice, the Chevron inquiry could arguably contain a
great number of gray areas within which judges could freely act. For a discussion of the
empirical results of the Chevron test in limiting judicial discretion, see infra note 58.
55. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 336 ("In place of a context-sensitive inquiry into
deference factors, courts now were required to fit the widely varying circumstances of
"); Merrill, supra note
agency rulemaking into Chevron's rather rigid decision tree ....
29, at 976 ("Chevron's first important innovation was the prescription of a procedural
formula for courts to follow in determining whether to defer to agency interpretations.");
Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 29294 (1986) (describing the "clear-cut analytic approach" of Chevron and noting how,
"[p]rior to Chevron, it was difficult to discern any single standard for judicial review of
agency interpretations").
56. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 50.
57. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 336 ("Although Chevron purported to simplify the
courts' task, it raised as many questions as it answered."). All of the articles cited in this
paper dealing with Chevron discuss some aspect of the two-part test or the practical
method in which the test is applied. These articles reveal that there are numerous
intricacies involved with the test. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2074-75 ("In view
of the breadth and importance of the [Chevron] decision, it should be unsurprising that
the case has been cited more than 1000 times since its publication in 1984."). However,
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improvement over the Skidmore inquiry in terms of cabining the
independent tendencies of judges within a determinative structure.58
Rather than merely picking a factor to support rejecting an agency
decision prior to Chevron, a court post-Chevron must identify the part of
the test that requires rejection of the agency decision. Thus, courts postChevron are at least pressured to refer to the test in revoking agency
decisionmaking. 59
The determinative nature of the Chevron test supports the second,
and most important, result of the test set forth in Chevron: In
establishing a test requiring judges to defer to agency decisionmaking in
even those that criticize the ability of Chevron to constrain the independent tendencies of
judges recognize that the test was an upgrade in determinacy and formalism over the
prior Skidmore standard. See, e.g., Shapiro & Levy, supra note 52, at 1069 (noting how
courts managed to get around the Chevron framework despite the determinacy of the
test).
58. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) (describing
in an empirical study how the contextual model has been replaced by Chevron and how
the study in general shows that the Chevron test tends to control the particular
preferences of judges); Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 94-95 ("Since the Court decided
Chevron, lower courts have applied its dictates with unusual consistency and often with
an almost alarming rigor.... Some judges read Chevron as a strong signal from the
Supreme Court that courts should not interfere with agency interpretations unless all
would agree that the statute clearly evidences a contrary meaning on the precise question
before the agency.").
Professor Seidenfeld comes to his conclusion through a look at an empirical
study done by Professors Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliott in the Duke Law Journal
that shows a statistically significant increase in affirmances after Chevron. See
Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 83 n.5. However, the study actually shows that the effect
was weakened in the long run as judges found ways around the Chevron test. See Schuck
& Elliott, supra note 52, at 1058-59; see also Shapiro & Levy, supra note 52, at 1062
("Balancing tests ... permit judges to reach more outcome-oriented decisions without a
sacrifice of craft. Open-ended tests, such as reasonableness, serve the same function.");
Starr, supra note 55, at 294 ("Chevron... strengthened the deference principle by
restricting the power of federal courts to reject an agency interpretation on the grounds of
infidelity to the policies underlying the statute."); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial
Interpretationof Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REv.
587, 601 (1984) (discussing how the test in Skidmore promotes results-oriented judging:
"If judges disagree with administrative interpretations, they can reject the interpretations
with minimal efforts: they need only choose their deference standard carefully or
supplant the deference rule with some other interpretive rule. The deference rule is
simply one of the many rules which comprise 'a bag of tricks from which courts can pull
respectable-sounding rules to justify any possible result."') (citing Quintin Johnstone, An
Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,3 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1954)).
59. See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More unto the Breach:
Reconciling Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v.
Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (2000) (discussing how the
Supreme Court in United States v. HaggarApparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), approached
the question of how much deference to give to Customs regulations with the background
assumption that "Chevron analysis is the 'usual rule' and the 'customary framework' in
judicial review of agency regulations").
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the absence of "explicit" congressional intent, the Court established a
background presumption of deference upon which future judicial
decisions would have to rest.60 Under the sliding-scale test of deference
in Skidmore, a judge attempts to give weight to those factors that "have
the power to persuade, if not the power to control., 61 Post-Chevron,
judges are required to decide cases against the backdrop of a Court that
appears to favor agency decisionmaking in particular contexts. Silence
in a statute, rather than requiring independent judicial review, establishes
a presumption under Chevron that Congress intended the agency to be
the institutional actor responsible for bridging the gap in the statute.6 2
This presumption is bolstered by the language throughout Chevron that
supports agency flexibility in decisionmaking and establishes the agency
as the primary interpretative authority in the area of policymaking.6 3
While a court can still avoid the dictates of the Chevron test in reaching a
decision that is results-oriented or less deferential than it should be, such
a decision would have to be particularly clear in its reasoning and its
justifications to overcome the background presumption that exists in
favor of agency decisionmaking. It is this strong presumption in favor of
as the
delegation that led one critic to describe the Chevron decision
64
state.
administrative
the
in
review
judicial
for
counter-Marbury
The determinacy of the Chevron test and the presumption in favor
of agency interpretation serve as an analytic barrier against active
judicial review of agency decisions. Even those who criticize the idea of
the Chevron decision as a revolution in administrative practice must
realize that, when compared to the Skidmore era of shifting deference,
the Chevron era was a virtual renaissance for agency flexibility and
independence. However, the Chevron test did bring with it several
questions, including whether there was still a role post-Chevron for the
60. See id. at 1191 (discussing Justice Scalia's broad interpretation of the
presumption of delegated authority to agencies in the 1996 decision, Smiley v. Citibank,
517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) ("We accord deference to agencies under Chevron...
because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency....")); Manning, supra note 45, at 625-26 ("Chevron held that
when Congress has not clearly designated the judiciary as the repository of delegated
lawmaking discretion, courts should presume that it has assigned that discretion to the
agency charged with administering the statute."); Merrill, supra note 29, at 979
(discussing the "presumption that whenever Congress has delegated authority to an
agency to administer a statute, it has also delegated authority to the agency to interpret
any ambiguities present in the statute .... In short, the Chevron opinion can be
understood as a prescription for resolving questions of statutory interpretation through a
series of presumptions about primary and delegated lawmaking.").
61. See supra text accompanying note 27.
62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
64. See Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2075.
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Skidmore test.
2.

Finding a Role for Skidmore Deference in the Chevron Era

In the years following Chevron, the debate over the revolutionary
aspects of the decision was matched by the debate over the reach of the
newly announced test. Commentators post-Chevron debated whether the
Chevron analysis applied only to rulemakings and formal adjudications,
or whether the test applied to all categories of agency action, including
such informal actions as opinion letters and amicus briefs.65 The chief
proponent of the view that Chevron was a broad decision that covered
the majority of agency actions was Justice Scalia, who believed that the
Skidmore sliding scale test of deference was an "anachronism" that had
no continuing relevancy to the practice of administrative law.66 In
opposition to Justice Scalia sat the majority of commentators on Chevron
who argued that there was still a role post-Chevron for a test of sliding
scale deference in the law.67 These commentators described the Chevron
two-part test as too deferential a standard for informal actions that lack

65. Despite the broad reach of the language in Chevron, the opinion dealt with a
legislative rule, and some thought the questions left unanswered in the decision created
ambiguities. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 336-37 ("Although Chevron purported to
simplify the courts' task, it raised as many questions as it answered.... Courts have
struggled with questions as... whether Chevron applies if the rule is interpretative rather
than legislative.").
66. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) [hereinafter
ARAMCO] ("In an era when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron,
the 'legislative rules vs. other action' dichotomy ... is an anachronism."). Justice Scalia
was responding to the use of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142
(1976), in which the majority applied Skidmore to interpretive rules. Justice Scalia will
return to his "anachronism" criticism of the Skidmore decision in later cases. See infra
text accompanying notes 91, 152.
Justice Scalia was not the only critic of the legislative rule limitation on the
breadth of Chevron. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 29, at 987 ("If Congress has delegated
authority to an agency to enforce a particular statute, and therefore (per Chevron) has
impliedly delegated interpretative authority to the agency, it should not matter if the
agency announces its interpretation through a brief as opposed to, for example, an
opinion letter written by the general counsel or an informal adjudication (both of which
have been held to be entitled to Chevron deference).").
67. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 858 (2001) (arguing for two doctrines of deference-Skidmore and Chevron-in
order for courts to apply something less than an all-or-nothing approach to agency
decisions lacking the force of law); Hasen, supra note 1, at 364 ("[T]he factors relied
upon by Chevron to support the presumption in favor of agency interpretations are
themselves suspect where Chevron provides a rule of statutory interpretation rather than
presumed legislative delegation."); Herz, supra note 46, at 193 (placing interpretive rules
within the context of Skidmore deference); Anthony, supra note 1, at 14 (determining that
informal agency decisions do not carry the force of law and "a reviewing court is not
bound by the agency interpretation"; instead, a court applies the Skidmore factors).
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due process or notice and comment protections.6 8 For informal agency
actions, a test of sliding scale deference should be used.6 9
The position favoring a Skidmore test of contextual deference as an
alternative to Chevron gained steam as the Supreme Court began moving
away from Chevron in the area of interpretive agency rules. 70 These
cases lacked consistency, however, as the Court interspersed its rulings
favoring a Skidmore-type test with decisions applying Chevron in similar
situations. 7 1 During the post-Chevron era, the use of the Skidmore
test
decision as binding precedent was limited, even if a Skidmore-type
was being used by some courts to come to a decision.72 The rare use of

68. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 67, at 858; Hasen, supra note 1, at 364.
69. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70. See ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 257-58 (holding that the EEOC's interpretation did
not fare well under an application of the Skidmore test). ARAMCO resurrected the
Court's Gilbert decision, which had applied Skidmore to interpretive rules. Id. This is an
interesting shift in jurisprudence, as Gilbert was decided almost a decade prior to
Chevron. See also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (applying "some" deference to
Bureau of Prisons's internal agency guideline); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (holding that Secretary of Labor's litigating
position, "[a]lthough not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the
exercise of the Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers,... [is] still entitled to some
weight on judicial review").
71. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (overturning court of
appeals for not applying Chevron principles to interpretive position that the Board of
Immigration Appeals had developed on a case-by-case basis); NationsBank of N.C., N.A.
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (upholding interpretation,
promulgated in a letter, of Comptroller of Currency); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36 (1993) (reversing Eleventh Circuit decision holding that commentary in Sentencing
Guidelines Manual was not binding on the courts); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974 (1986) (ruling that an interpretation contained in an FDA no-action letter
deserved Chevron deference and upholding the interpretation despite the existence of a
second, preferable interpretation); see also Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron
Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Sena Ripieni Use ofChevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity,
19 Miss. C. L. REV. 115, 125 n.60 (1998) ("The current deference standard for informal
rules is apparently changing since Chevron deference ... has been applied to both formal
and informal rules.... But, the Skidmore standard maintains its vitality as a substitute for
Chevron deference in cases involving interpretive (informal) rules."); Donna M. Nagy,
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current
Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 976 (1998) ("[T]he
Court has not yet resolved the question of whether courts must accord Chevron deference
when an agency with congressionally delegated rulemaking or adjudicative authority
does not in fact use that authority, but instead announces its statutory interpretation in an
alternative format.... [Iln a number of... cases, the Court has cited Chevron and
appears to have deferred to statutory interpretations that agencies did not promulgate
under APA notice and comment procedures."). Professor Nagy cites as examples of
Chevron deference to informal agency actions Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995)
(adopting Bureau of Prisons's statement under Chevron), and Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S.
368 (1987) (deferring under Chevron to HHS statement in manual and letters), among
others. Nagy, supra, at 976 n.249.
72. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 1110 ("[H]istorically courts and scholars paid scant
attention to what Skidmore deference means. Few law review articles address the topic.
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Skidmore and the cabining of its test for occasional use in the area of
interpretive rules and informal agency action ensured that the
presumption of deference to agency decisionmaking in Chevron was
alive and well.7 3 In addition, the inconsistent application of the Skidmore
test continued to cast doubt on the vitality of the test. 74 It was not until

the Supreme Court's decisions in Christensen v. Harris County75 and
United States v. Mead Corp.76 that the Court signaled a return to the
Skidmore test. This return signaled a new era of lessened judicial
deference to agency decisionmaking, an era that will come to be
recognized as the counter-revolution to Chevron.
C.

The Next Era of JudicialDeference: Christensen and Mead

The first two major administrative law decisions of the twenty-first
century are also, appropriately, the signal of a new era of lessened
judicial deference to agency interpretations. Christensen and Mead
confirmed in judicial precedent the signals the Supreme Court had given
in earlier cases that it was unprepared to extend Chevron deference to
informal agency actions.7 7 However, it was the Mead decision that truly
signaled the beginning of a new era of deference, as it issued a new test
for agency decisionmaking that will come to be recognized as a
watershed event in the history of administrative law. Significantly, this
new test is not limited to informal actions, suggesting that the Supreme
Court desires to return the courts to an institutional position superior to
that of administrative agencies.
1.

Christensenv. HarrisCounty

It is appropriate that the beginning of the shift to the third era of
deference in administrative law, the Christensen case, dealt with an
interpretation by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.78 Under section 207(o)
of the FLSA, employers are required to grant employees compensatory

And, although Skidmore has been around nearly forty years longer than Chevron, it is

cited by courts less than twenty percent as often."); see also infra Part III.B (discussing
the relatively rare number of cases citing the Skidmore decision prior to Christensen).
73. See Chapman, supra note 71, at 117 (noting that Chevron is still the "primary
standard for deference" despite the occasional use of Skidmore with interpretive rules);
see also infra Part III.B.
74. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
75. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. Christensen,529 U.S. at 576.
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time for overtime work.79 If the employee chose not to use the "comp
time," the employer was required to pay cash for the time in certain
circumstances. 80 Fearing the effect these payments might have on its
budget, the Harris County Sheriffs Department ("Department") adopted
a policy that allowed an employee's supervisor to order the employee to
use his or her compensatory time if the employee had reached a certain
number of maximum hours. 81 Employees of the Department sued,
claiming that the policy of the Department violated the FLSA.82
The Supreme Court had at its disposal an advisory letter that the
Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division wrote to the Sheriffs
Department after Harris County had requested an answer concerning its
proposed policy. 83 The agency responded by arguing that the FLSA only
allowed the county to enact its policy if there is a prior agreement with
its employees: "Absent such an agreement, it is our position that neither
the statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require an employee
to use accrued compensatory time., 84
The employees and the
government argued to the
Supreme
Court
that
this opinion deserved
85
deference under Chevron.
The Supreme Court, however, criticized the lack of procedural
protections involved in producing the opinion and rejected the
application of Chevron:
Here ...we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter,
not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion
letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which
lack the force of
86
law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.
As support for this conclusive pronouncement on informal agency
88
87
actions, the Court cited the Reno v. Koray and EEOC v. ARAMCO
line of cases and ignored the previous confusion at the Supreme Court
and lower court levels about the proper standard of judicial review for
informal agency actions. 89 In place of Chevron deference, the Court
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 578.
Id.
Seeid. at 581.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 586.
Id.
515 U.S. 50 (1995).
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991)

[hereinafter

ARAMCO].

89.

See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; see also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying
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applied the Skidmore test of persuasiveness.9 °
Justice Scalia, while concurring in the judgment of the Court, was
decidedly discouraged by the application of the Skidmore test by the
majority in reviewing the agency's interpretation: "Skidmore deference
to authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in
which we declined to give agency interpretations ... authoritative

effect." 9' Justice Scalia argued that this test ended once the Chevron
decision was announced, and he pointed to several Supreme Court cases
in which deference to agency interpretations in informal formats had
been granted by the Court (a line of cases that the majority neglected to
mention).92 In fact, Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Breyer's
contention, in the dissenting opinion in Christensen, that there could ever
be a time in which Chevron deference is inapplicable outside of three
limited reasons enunciated in the Chevron decision: (1) the statute is
ambiguous, (2) no interpretation has been made by the agency, or (3) the
interpretation was not authoritative.93 Justice Scalia recognized in his
criticism of the other members of the Court that Christensenwas the first
step in a dangerous course towards an erosion of the presumption of
deference articulated explicitly and implicitly in Chevron:
The specific example of the inapplicability of Chevron that Justice
Breyer posits.., appears to assume that, after finding a statute to be
ambiguous, we must ask in addition, before we can invoke Chevron
deference, whether Congress intended the ambiguity to be resolved
by the administering agency. That is not so. Chevron establishes a
presumption that ambiguities are to be resolved (within94the bounds of
reasonable interpretation) by the administering agency.

text. The Supreme Court also cited Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991), arguing that the case excluded interpretative
rules and enforcement guidelines from the level of deference normally given to the
Secretary in the exercise of his "delegated lawmaking powers." Christensen, 529 U.S. at
587.
90. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
91. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
92. See id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia cited as proof of the Court's past
inconsistency on this issue NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (granting deference to a letter of the Comptroller of the
Currency), and Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 978-79 (granting
deference to FDA's "longstanding interpretation of the statute," issued in a no-action
notice), among other cases. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also
noted that these three exceptions would preclude the application of Skidmore as well as
Chevron deference. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Whether Congress would leave a highly significant
issue unaddressed for the agency to decide is merely a factor in a Chevron step one
inquiry in Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Nevertheless, Justice Scalia still decided against deference to the
the agency's interpretation was not
agency's position, as he believed that
95
a reasonable one under the statute.
The importance and the danger in Justice Scalia's eyes of the
Christensen decision was in moving away from the presumption of
delegation to agency decisionmaking that was established in Chevron.
The danger that Christensen posed to agencies was identified in the
majority opinion. For example, the majority used traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, such as expressio unius.9 6 This approach is
unremarkable, as the same approach traditionally occurred under the first
step of the Chevron test. 97 But what is remarkable is that the majority
had not even mentioned a test or standard of deference that would apply
to the agency's interpretation of the statute prior to evaluating the proper
interpretation of the FLSA.98 The decision on the interpretation of the
statute suddenly became one of pure judicial interpretation, absent
notions of deference. In fact, when the majority came to the deference
issue and applied Skidmore deference, the only mention of the
application of the Skidmore test was made in passing: "As explained
above, we find unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute at
issue in this case." 99 Gone were the Skidmore factors that weighed in
evaluating what level of deference should be applied to an agency
opinion.' 00 Skidmore deference, at least in its application to postChevron informal actions, appeared to mean no deference at all. This
trend became magnified in Mead, the third seminal case in the history of
administrative law.

95.

Id. at 591 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

96. Id. at 583.
97. In the majority opinion in Chevron, Justice Stevens began his analysis of
whether Congress has directly spoken on the definition of "stationary source" by
examining the text of the Clean Air Act at length and continued the analysis by looking at
the legislative history of the Act, including speeches and committee reports. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 846-65 (1984). Going beyond the text of a statute
and using other tools such as legislative history has been controversial, particularly with
the arrival of Justice Scalia to the Court, but the majority has allowed the use of such
tools, particularly in cases concerning "pure questions of statutory construction." See,
e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (disagreeing with Attorney General's
construction of two asylum provisions and using legislative history to determine the
proper construction).
98. The majority had merely mentioned the existence of an agency opinion on the
issue. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581. Before even discussing the deference issue, the
majority had come to a decision on the "better reading" of the statute. Id. at 585.
99. Id. at 587.
100. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Mead Corp.

The Christensen decision still left open the question of whether or
not the Supreme Court was embarking on a significant limitation of
Chevron, or whether it was merely another inconsistent decision in the
context of judicial deference to informal agency actions. True, the
Supreme Court's language in Christensen seemed to preclude the
application of Chevron to informal agency actions, and to resurrect
Skidmore. However, it was not until Mead that the Supreme Court
definitively signaled the beginning of a new era of deference.
In Mead, the dispute centered around a ruling by the United States
Customs Service ("Customs") that changed the classification of the
Mead Corporation's day planners.' 0° Previously, these day planners had
been placed in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS) under the heading for "registers, account books, notebooks,
order books, receipt books, letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries and
similar articles."' 0 2 There were two subcategories included within this
heading. The first covered "diaries, notebooks and address books,
bound; memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles," while the
second broadly covered "other" items. 0 3 Items in the first subcategory
were taxed under a four-percent tariff while items in the second
subcategory were free of tariffs. 10 4 In January of 1993, the Customs
Service changed a four-year policy of treating Mead's day planners
under the "other" subcategory and classified them as "Diaries...,
10 6
bound."'0 5 This change in policy came in the form of a ruling letter.
Under Customs regulations,' ° 7 a tariff ruling "represents the official
position of the Customs Service with respect to the particular transaction
or issue therein and is binding on all Customs Service personnel.' 0 8 A
ruling letter is very limited, as it only applies to a small category of
goods and is determined on a case-by-case basis. 0 9 Because these
rulings are made quickly and on a case-by-case basis, they are not
subject to notice and comment. 1 0 A letter can be issued by any of the
Customs offices and need not include any reasoning for the decision

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
19 C.F.R. § 177.8 (2002).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 222.
Id. at 223.
Id.
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included in the letter."'
In analyzing the dispute, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit gave no deference to the ruling letter issued by Customs. 1 2 The

court of appeals thought that the planners were not diaries because they
"had no space for 'relatively extensive notations about events,
observations, feelings, or thoughts' in the past."'" 3 The court also
engaged in a bit of statutory interpretation, arguing that the language of
"diaries, bound" necessarily required the existence of an alternate
category in a different classification of "diaries, unbound."" 14 To include
all ringed binders in the "diaries, bound" category would eliminate the
existence of any alternate category,
thereby making the regulatory
15
language unnecessarily superfluous. 5
a.

The Opinion of the Majority

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."16 In doing so, the Supreme
Court issued a new test that was premised on the notion of a middle
ground existing for informal agency actions between Chevron deference
and no deference at all. The new test issued in Mead should soon
become just as familiar, if not more so, than the two-part test of Chevron
and the sliding scale test of deference in Skidmore: "[A]dministrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the
' 17
exercise of that authority." "
This new test of deference should be conceptualized as the first
element of a much larger post-Mead test that applies to all agency
decisions that a court is charged with reviewing, not just informal agency
actions. Within this first element, there are two separate inquiries that a
court must make in determining the standard of deference to apply to an
agency interpretation. The first inquiry (1(a)) requires that the reviewing
court determine whether Congress has granted the agency the power to
act with the force of law generally (that is, whether the agency has the
ability to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal

111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 226.
Id.

114. Id.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 238-39.
Id.at 226-27.
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adjudications).1 18 If such general authority is lacking, then Chevron
deference does not apply. If the agency does have the authority to
engage in such actions (if it has the force of law "generally"), then the
reviewing court proceeds to the second inquiry of the first element of the
test.
Under the second inquiry (1(b)), the reviewing court looks more
specifically at the particular agency action in question and attempts to
determine whether the agency is acting with the force of law in the
particular action in question." 9 This backup to the test of delegated
authority in 1(a) seems to the Court to be necessary due to the problems20
endemic to statutory interpretation that were mentioned in Chevron.
Often Congress does not explicitly state that an agency has interpretive
authority on a particular question. 12 Thus, Chevron recognized the need
for a presumption when dealing with gaps in statutes that require a
degree of interpretation. 2 2 The Mead Court saw another way around
these gaps. Even if no general authority to engage in notice and
comment or formal adjudication is found, an agency action might still
deserve Chevron deference if the particular action in question was the
product of "a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
such force.' ' 123 The focus of the inquiry in 1(b) is the level of procedural
protections in effect when the agency promulgated the ruling in question.
If the agency action has met 1(a) and has granted procedural protections
sufficient to meet l(b), then the agency action will be granted Chevron
deference.
While this second inquiry might seem to be a way for an agency
lacking in the general congressional authorization under the inquiry in
1(a) to create sufficient procedures under 1(b) for Chevron deference to
apply, the inquiry in 1(b) is still based on express authorization by
Congress to implement these formal procedures.' 24 Thus, it will be
118. Id.
119. Id. at 227.
120. Id.at 228.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
123. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
124. Id. at 230 ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force."). This quote shows that the focus of the
inquiry in 1(b) remains the intent of Congress in delegating to the agency. Procedural
protections are only a means to that end. See id. at 230 n. 11 ("'If Chevron rests on a
presumption about congressional intent, then Chevron should apply only where Congress
would want Chevron to apply.... [lI]t is therefore important to determine whether a
plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation to mean that

2002]

INTO THE THIRD

ERA OF ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

difficult for an agency without expressly mandated procedural steps by

Congress to create formal procedures that give a particular action the
force of law,1 25 and the most likely effect of the l(b) will be to allow
courts to reject actions instituted by agencies that generally have the
ability to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudications
but, in promulgating the particular action in question, have neglected to
provide the necessary level of procedural guaranties. A perfect example
of this effect is the manner in which the Supreme Court disposed of
Chevron deference for the Customs Service's ruling.
In analyzing the ruling of Customs, the Supreme Court only
ambiguously referenced the two inquiries in the Mead test.126 However,
it appears that the Court rejected the ruling at the 1(b) inquiry. First, the
Supreme Court noted, under what appears to be the 1(a) inquiry, that "the
general rulemaking power conferred on Customs... authorizes some
regulation with the force of law, or 'legal norms.' ' 127 Understanding the
1(a) inquiry to be satisfied, the Court moved on to the 1(b) inquiry.
Here, the Court believed that the lack of specific procedural protections
used in issuing ruling letters created doubt that Congress ever intended to
allow Customs to issue ruling letters with the force of law. 128 The Court
noted that "Customs does not generally engage in notice-and-comment
practice when issuing them, and their treatment by the agency makes it
clear that a letter's binding character as a ruling stops short of third
parties."' 129 The Court's fear over the lack of specific procedural
different
protections was heightened due to the fact that forty-six
' ' 30
year.
each
them
of
15,000
to
10,000
Customs offices "issue

agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority."') (quoting Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 67, at 872). These declarations show a more intense focus on the express will of
Congress than was shown in Chevron, where the focus was much more on implicit
delegations. See supratext accompanying notes 45-48.
125. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. The Supreme Court, in explaining the need for a court to
find congressionally mandated formal procedures in order to apply Chevron deference to
a particular action, noted that the "overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication." Id. at 230. The Court did note that there are cases in which courts have
found informal agency actions deserving of Chevron deference. Id. (citing NationsBank
of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)). But, given the
Court's application of the Mead test to the facts of the case, it would be hard to imagine
what type of informal action would be deserving of deference under this new standard.
126. Id. at 231 ("No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs ruling
letter in this case, it fails to qualify under Chevron.").
127. Id. at 232.
128. Id. at 233 ("It is difficult.., to see in the agency practice itselfany indication
that Customs ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make
classifications like these.") (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The Court, under 1(b) of the Mead test, looked to procedural
deficiencies of the Customs rulings in order to determine whether
Congress could have possibly intended these rulings to bear the force of
law. This inquiry seemingly turns the presumption of deference in
Chevron on its head. Rather than looking at agency decisionmaking
against the background presumption of deference,131 the Supreme Court
in Mead attempted to identify any factor that weighs against the
inference of delegation.
The remaining question is what happens in the second element of
the Mead test after steps 1(a) and l(b). If the answer is no delegation
under either 1(a) or 1(b), then the above discussion shows that Chevron
deference does not apply. However, the Supreme Court in Mead did, in
the end, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
1 32
Circuit, which gave no deference at all to the ruling letter by Customs.
The reason for this reversal was the Supreme Court's disagreement with
the all-or-nothing approach of the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court placed Skidmore as the new catch-all measure
of deference for agency actions failing either the 1(a) or 1(b) inquiry of
the Mead test.1 33 In remanding the case to the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court directed the appellate court to consider the merit of the
ruling's "thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with prior
interpretations, and any other source of weight."' 34 The difficulties that
courts have had in applying the Skidmore factors was mentioned by the
Supreme Court,'35 but the Supreme Court did not choose to identify what
level of deference was proper.' 36 The Court instead decided to allow
lower courts to determine the proper application of a test that had fallen
131. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
132. See supratext accompanying note 116.
133. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28 ("[W]hile not all choices bind judges to follow them,
they certainly may influence courts facing questions the agencies have already
answered.... The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute
has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of
the agency's care [General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)], its consistency
[Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 (1993)], formality [Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50 (1995)], and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's
position.").
134. Id. at 236. The agency's position on remand did not get any stronger, as the
traditional Skidmore inquiry was ignored by the Federal Circuit in such an obvious
manner that the only thing that appeared to change after the Supreme Court's decision
was the citation of Skidmore. The level of deference given to the agency's interpretation
remained at zero. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
"Despite Customs' relative expertise and the reasoning in its classification ruling," the
court decided not to agree with its position. Id. at 1350.
135. Mead, 553 U.S. at 228 ("The [Skidmore] approach has produced a spectrum of
judicial responses, from great respect at one end to near indifference at the other.").
136. Id.
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out of general use since the Chevron decision.

The Mead decision thus establishes a framework for judicial
decisionmaking that tracks the following path of reasoning:
Inquiry 1(a) - Has Congress delegated authority to the agency generally
to make rules carrying the force of law?

I

Ie

I Skidmore deference

J

Inquiry 1(b) - Does the particular agency interpretation in question
have sufficient procedural protections to show that Congress could have
intended it to carry the force of law?

If noI

Skidmore deference

I Two-part Chevron Test

Several courts after Mead have attempted to follow this test as if it
were as logical as outlined above. 137 The best example of a court
applying the test correctly according to the model identified by the

137. See Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) (granting
Chevron deference to EPA's interpretation of Clean Water Act's antidumping
requirements); Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (deciding that EPA's
grant of Treatment-As-Tribe (TAS) status to Native-American tribe was not arbitrary or
unreasonable); Yanco v. United States, 258 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron
deference to Bureau of Justice Assistance's refusal to read "traumatic injury" to include
death caused by stress); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d
905 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that Arts and Crafts Board's interpretation of "Indian
product" as product manufactured by a Native-American was not arbitrary or capricious);
U.S. Steel v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 2d 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001) (granting Chevron
deference to agency's interpretation of antidumping laws).
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Supreme Court in Mead is American Wildlands v. Browner.'38 In
reviewing the EPA's approval of Montana's water quality standards, the
Tenth Circuit was faced with the question of whether the Agency's
decision was deserving of Chevron deference. 139 The court outlined the
Chevron test, but, before applying the test, included the second
level of
140
inquiry outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Mead.
Rather than merely deciding the question based on the form in
which the Agency's interpretation was promulgated, the court
approached the Mead test as two separate inquiries. First, the question
was whether "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally [to
make such determinations] carrying the force of law."' 141 Under the 1(a)
inquiry, the court determined that Congress had delegated authority to
the EPA generally to make determinations concerning water quality
standards. 142 The court went beyond the specifics of the case and noted
that the Agency had been delegated broad power by Congress to
administer and interpret the Clean Water Act. 143
Once it determined that Congress had delegated power generally for
the Agency to act with the force of law, the court moved on to the 1(b)
inquiry in order to determine if the particular action in question had been
promulgated within the exercise of the authority granted by Congress.
This was an easy question for the court, as the authority granted to the
EPA to make determinations on water quality was relatively specific to
the case at hand. The EPA's decision concerning Montana's water
quality standards fits within this specific delegation of authority and is
therefore an action "promulgated in the exercise of that authority."
Because the Mead elements had been met, the court then went on to
apply the two-part Chevron test. 144
An equally powerful example of the proper application of Mead
occurred in Native American Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc.145 Here
again a court, as a predicate to granting Chevron deference, attempted to
146
determine whether the two separate Mead inquiries had been met.
Under l(a), the court held that there was express delegation of
interpretive authority and that the Arts and Crafts Board's power to
engage in notice and comment generally was indicative of the power to

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1196
Id. at 1196-97:
Id.at 1197.
Id.
Id.

144. Id.
145. 168 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
146. Id. at 916.
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act with the force of law. 147 Under 1(b) the court was convinced that the
specific action of the agency in question in the case had been
promulgated under the authority found in 1(a), as the interpretation was
contained in a notice-and-comment rulemaking.148 After the Mead
analysis, the court granted Chevron deference to the Board's
interpretation. 49
These two cases show the proper method of interpreting the test in
Mead. It is important to separate the two inquiries-general and
specific-according to the logic used by the Supreme Court. If the
inquiries are conflated, and the focus is simply on the procedural
protections provided in the specific action under review, then a court
may errantly grant greater deference to an action promulgated with
procedural protections added by an agency that has not been granted
general authority to act with the force of law (for example, to issue rules
through notice and comment). While the two inquiries are closely
related, the Supreme Court in Mead identified both l(a) and l(b) as
essential for an agency to meet in order to receive Chevron deference. 150
b.

Justice Scalia 's Dissent in Mead

Justice Scalia strongly dissented in Mead, declaring: "Today's
opinion makes an avulsive change in judicial review of federal
administrative action."' 5' Justice Scalia returned to his opinion that, in
light of Chevron, the Skidmore decision is an anachronism and argued
given Chevron deference to
that the Supreme Court has consistently
52
informal agency interpretations.
Justice Scalia's main fear in his dissent in Mead appears to be the
reversal in the majority decision of the two unquestioned factors present
in the Chevron decision: the determinacy of the Chevron test and, most
147. Id.
148. Id. ("As stated earlier, the Board followed notice-and-comment procedures in
promulgating the regulations-a proper exercise of delegated authority. It defined
'Indian product' as it was specifically instructed to do."). The court's decision was as
legitimate, but somewhat different, than American Wildlands decision. In American
Wildlands, the focus was on the particular authority granted and whether the particular
action was within that authority. Supra notes 138-44 and accompanying test. In Native
American Arts, the court focused more on the procedures that the agency is able to use
under the authority granted by Congress, and whether the interpretation had been
promulgated through these procedures (that is, whether the interpretation was in the form
of a rulemaking). Supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. The Native American Arts
approach is a more general understanding of how courts should approach the test, but
both cases are helpful in showing how courts should separate the inquiries.
149. Native Am. Arts, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
dissenting).
151. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
152. Id. at 251-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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importantly, the background presumption of deference. In terms of the
determinacy of the Chevron test, Justice Scalia warned that, in a society
dependent on administrative actions, reintroducing the uncertain and
unpredictable Skidmore test of deference was an "irresponsible" action
by the Court. 153 Justice Scalia worried that agency decisionmaking
might actually slow to a halt post-Mead, considering that agencies will
now have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to withstand
strong judicial scrutiny, 5 4 and agencies will have to limit flexibility (or
inconsistency), once valued in Chevron, in their decisionmaking
process.155
The most important effect of Mead that Justice Scalia decried was
the reversal of the presumption that existed in Chevron in favor of
agency decision making. 156 Post-Mead,the presumption has changed to
one of no deference, which "must be overcome by legislative intent to
the contrary. ' 57 Justice Scalia's criticisms of Mead, if given weight by
empirical evidence, are proof of a drastically different era of deference
post-Mead. It is necessary to review the empirical evidence to determine
if Mead is truly the counterrevolution that Justice Scalia presaged.
III. The Effects of the Mead Decision: A Counterrevolution in Practice
The following study of the practical effects of Mead will include a
look at cases decided in the six months directly following the issuance of
the decision. When the Mead line of cases is compared against cases of
the prior era, the cases will be drawn from the year prior to the Supreme
153. Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It was possible to live with the indeterminacy
of Skidmore deference in earlier times. But in an era when federal statutory law
administered by federal agencies is pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or
unintended) that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-circumstances
Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation.
To condemn a vast body of agency action to that regime... is irresponsible."). Justice
Scalia's concern over uncertainty must be worsened by the majority's refusal to at least
identify a range of deference between no deference and full deference that courts should
grant under the Skidmore test.
154. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Another practical effect of today's opinion
will be an artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking. Buy stock in the GPO.
Since informal rulemaking and formal adjudication are the only more-or-less safe harbors
from the storm that the Court has unleashed; and since formal adjudication is not an
option but must be mandated by statute or constitutional command; informal
rulemaking-which the court was once careful to make voluntary unless required by
statute-will now become a virtual necessity.") (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("For the indeterminately large number of
statutes taken out of Chevron by today's decision, however, ambiguity (and hence
flexibility) will cease with the first judicial resolution.").
156. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What was previously a general presumption of
authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been authorized to
enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority ....
157. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
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Court's move to the Mead test beginning with Christensen. Whenever a
percentage or number is cited for the first time, there will be a footnote
explaining the methodology in more precise detail. It is always difficult
to come to a definitive conclusion using amorphous categories in such a
confused area of the law, but the numbers drawn from empirical searches
of the cases are done as objectively as possible, highlighting particular
trends that stand out.
A.

DevaluingDeterminacy

One of the two effects of Mead mentioned in the previous part that
Justice Scalia feared had been eroded with the Supreme Court's decision
in Mead is the simplicity and the formality of the test in Chevron. The
Mead test appears on face value to be as formalistic as the Chevron test.
The fact that the test can be charted, as shown in Part II.C.2, is proof that
courts can make an objective judgment concerning whether or not an
agency action carries with it the "force of law." However, cases decided
in the six months following Mead indicate that courts have had a difficult
time finding one uniform standard with which to work.
The definition of "force of law" is not new to administrative law.158
Its use in a test similar to the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Mead
was predicted and recommended by several commentators prior to its use
for interpretive rules in Christensen.5 9 Simply, an action with the "force
of law" is an action that is binding on those that act, those acted upon,
158. The phrase "force of law" is one with which judges and commentators are
familiar due to its traditional role in separating legislative rules from interpretive rules.
See Anthony, supra note 1, at 55 ("Legislative rules have the full force of law and are
binding on a court subject only to review under an arbitrary and capricious standard.
Interpretive rules do not have the force of law and even though courts often defer to an
agency's interpretive rule they are always free to choose otherwise.") (quoting Joseph v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
159. See Anthony, supra note 1, at 55-56 ("[The] precisely relevant quality [of
interpretive rules and policy statements] is that they lack the force of law-that is, they
cannot bind the courts even if they are consistent with the statute and reasonable. This
circumstance is not changed by Chevron.... Where the reviewing court has found no
delegation of power to interpret authoritatively in such a format, then, its proper approach
is not that of Chevron Step 2 but rather that of Skidmore."). Professor Anthony's "force
of law" test, which predates the Mead test by almost a decade, had even been discussed
and debated. See Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulatory Interpretations:Individual
Statements, 80 Ky. L.J. 987, 1000 (1992) ("I find Anthony's [force of law] test
unworkable because of his focus on congressional intent. It is very difficult to know, in a
given case, whether Congress intended for agency interpretations issued in a particular
format to be binding."); see also Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2101 ("Chevron's principle
of deference, then, is an attempted reconstruction of congressional instructions, one that
is responsive to the comparative advantages of the agency in administering complex
statutes.... We have seen that when the agency has not been accorded law-interpreting
power, no deference is due.").
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and on the courts that are entrusted with reviewing the agency's
interpretation.
The authority to act with the force of law comes from
Congress, often, as noted in Mead, in the ability to act through notice and
comment.16 1 While the phrase seems simple on face, the way that the
"force of law" of an agency action is determined has led to wide
divergences in approach, limiting any determinacy value of the Mead
test.
The approaches that courts have taken in applying the Mead test can
be grouped into three main categories. The first category includes those
courts that have separated the 1(a) and 1(b) inquiries in Mead and then
applied either Skidmore or Chevron deference. 162 As discussed above,
this approach appears to be the closest to the one that the Supreme Court
used in determining whether the Customs ruling in Mead deserved
deference. 63 However, the Supreme Court in Mead declined to grant
Chevron deference to the ruling despite the finding that Customs had
been granted notice-and-comment powers under the 1(a) inquiry.164 The
motivating force behind the Court's decision was its analysis under 1(b)
of the Mead test that the procedures used by the agency were insufficient
to be promulgated within the authority granted to the agency by
Congress to issue rules with the force of law.' 65 This conclusion helps
clarify the -viewpoint of the courts in the second category: courts that
view the Mead decision as limiting the scope of Chevron to formal
166
actions.

160. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 67, at 882 ("[I]n determining whether
Congress has delegated power to issue legally binding rules or orders, the key question is
whether the statute provides that a violation of the agency directive can result in the
immediate imposition of sanctions unless the rule or order is set aside on review or stayed
pending review.").
161. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) ("Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or. by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent."); Hasen, supra note 1, at 354 ("Interpretive rules,
which are not promulgated under the APA's notice and comment procedure, do not have
the force and effect of law."); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
162. See sources cited supranote 137; see also supra notes 137-49 and accompanying
text.
163. See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
166. See Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Am. Fed'n
of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2001); Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.

2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); Am. Express Co. v. United
States, 262 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2001); United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d
1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001); St. Luke's Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765
(N.D. Iowa 2001); United States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.
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In this category, courts engage in a relatively simple
decisionmaking process post-Mead. If the interpretation of the agency is
promulgated in a form that was mentioned approvingly by the Supreme
Court in Mead (notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication), then
Conversely, if the
the court will apply Chevron deference.' 67
interpretation is in a form that has traditionally been considered less
deserving of deference, such as opinion letters, amicus briefs, or other
materials (mentioned disapprovingly in Mead),168 then the court will
apply Skidmore or some lesser form of deference. 169 This bright-line test
based on the form of the agency action containing the interpretation is a
logical conclusion to draw from the language in Mead.170 Unfortunately,
looking only at the form of the agency action tends to focus too heavily
on the general authority granted to the agency under the l(a) inquiry.
The 1(b) inquiry becomes less of a separate inquiry, essentially requiring
that the form that meets the requirement of 1(a) be employed to meet the
inquiry under 1(b). This view risks eliminating actions that are
traditionally categorized as informal but have been issued by agencies
that (1) have been generally granted the authority to act with the force of
law (under 1(a)), and (2) have added additional procedural protections to
the informal action (under l(b)). The possibility is mentioned by the
Supreme Court in Mead that such an action could deserve Chevron
deference, 171 and at least three courts post-Mead have already upheld
Mass. 2001); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Acromed Corp., 202
F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Bousa, Inc. v. United States, No. 90-12-00658, 2001 Ct. Intl.
Trade LEXIS 63 (Apr. 26, 2001).
167. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co., 258 F.3d at 1347 ("Commerce's methodology was
adopted after notice-and-comment rulemaking, and thus is entitled to maximum
deference."); 10,510 Packaged Computer Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (citing Mead
solely for the proposition that it limited Chevron deference).
168. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
169. See, e.g., Am. Fed. of Gov't Employees, Local 2119, 262 F.3d at 656 ("[I
]nformal agency interpretations such as those contained in 'opinion letters ...policy
statements, agency manuals and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
lawt-do not warrant Chevron-style deference."') (quoting Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)); Nat'l Amusements, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.5 ("[A]n
agency's litigating position, which is in the nature of a 'post hoc rationalization' rather
than the result of the official exercise of rulemaking authority, is not entitled to Chevron
deference.") (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. 576; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 288
U.S. 204 (1988)).
170. The "promulgated in the exercise of that authority" language could be read
simply to require a court to double check the form of the agency action under 1(b) to
make sure that the form is one that has been listed by the Mead Court as requiring general
deference under the 1(a) inquiry.
171. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 ("[T]he overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication. That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment rulemaking is in
pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the
case....").
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such an action using the separate two part inquiry. 172
The third category of cases interpreting the Mead test includes those
courts that look solely to the adequacy of the procedural protections
provided by the agency in issuing an interpretation or decision affecting
a regulated entity. 7 3 Courts in this category focus on the procedures
provided by the agency to protect or inform regulated individuals or
groups. If the procedures are lacking, Chevron deference will not be
afforded to the agency's interpretation. 74 While this group seems
similar to the second category, it is actually the converse under the Mead
inquiry. In the second category, the 1(b) inquiry was subsumed by 1(a).
In this category, the focus on procedures under 1(b) eliminates any check
on the general delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies by
Congress under 1(a). The problem with this approach is that an informal
172. Pesquera Mares Australes, Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that Commerce's antidumping determination deserves Chevron deference
despite the fact that the action is not in the form of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication). In Pesquera Mares Australes, the court stated:
We understand Mead to clearly recognize that Chevron deference is not limited
to regulations adopted after notice-and-comment rulemaking. The line that
Mead draws is not defined with great clarity. However, we conclude that
Chevron deference is due at least to those statutory interpretations that are
articulated in any "relatively formal administrative procedure," where Congress
has provided for agency resolution of rights, subject to deferential judicial
review ... and those interpretations are embodied in rulings that are given
precedential effect by the agency.
Id.; see Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.D.C. 2001) ("According to the
Mead Court, sufficient delegation of authority will be clear where the adjudication or
rule-making occurs according to formal procedures, but in the case of informal processes,
the delegation may be shown 'by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent."'); Favreau v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 635 (2001) (granting "substantial
deference" to Department of Defense memoranda and affidavits).
In all three decisions, the courts were careful to note under 1(a) that Congress
had delegated authority to the agency generally to engage in adjudications with the force
of law. It is interesting that the informal action at issue in both Pesquera Mares
Australes and Fontana was an informal adjudication. It seems that this might be the
major gray area that the Court was not prepared to reach in Mead. See, e.g., Matz v.
Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Although
the Supreme Court indicated in Mead that Chevron deference may apply to
interpretations developed from less formal rulemaking procedures, it did not expressly
outline when this would be the case.").
173. See Matz, 265 F.3d 572; Merck & Co., Inc. v. FDA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C.
2001); Pivot Point Int'l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
174. See, e.g., Matz, 265 F.3d at 575 ("We do not believe that a position set forth in
an amicus brief, supported by some Revenue Rulings and an agency manual are formal
enough to warrant Chevron treatment."); Merck, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 31 ("The Board
provided no reasoned explanation of why it ultimately concluded that the length of
Merck's study or the number of participants made the study not 'fairly responsive,' nor
did it give any indication that it employed the sort of 'care, [] consistency, [and]
formality' in making its decision that is necessary before this Court--or any court-owes
it substantial deference.").
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action with sufficient procedural protections under 1(b) might still not be
acceptable under 1(a) due to the lack of general delegation by Congress
to the agency to act with the force of law (that is, to engage in noticeand-comment rulemaking or adjudication).
These three categories include decisions by courts that are using
logical, if in some cases technically incorrect, applications of the Mead
test. At least these courts are principled in attempting to understand the
very minute details and gray areas of the test. Some courts post-Mead

have given up on any determinative approach to the test and have instead
substituted a contextual approach similar to the one used by courts in the
Skidmore era but complicated by the addition of factors from the
Chevron and Mead eras.1 75 The approaches taken by these courts show
the danger to formality and consistency posed by a test that includes
three major tests and many different inquiries within one logical
framework.
The clearest example of the confusion that could result from
application of the Mead test can be seen in Davis v. United States. 76 In
Davis, the court was attempting to determine whether an agency's
interpretation of statutory language deserved deference.1 77 In making
this decision, the court performed an exhaustive study of the various
approaches that have developed to deference.' 78 Instead of viewing the
Mead test as the new framework for determining deference, it included
various separate factors from Mead and Skidmore that, in light of the test
in Chevron, weighed for or against deference:

"The rule of deference

that emerges from the Chevron line of cases is a rule of broad application
with an extensive, but not exhaustive, catalog of limitations."1 79 While
the court's list might not be exhaustive, it would be completely
exhausting for a court to wade through, taking up three full pages in the
court's opinion. 80 The court in Davis does manage to wade through
175.

See Fujian Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 2d

1305 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001) (remanding determination of several issues to Commerce for
further explanation, including explaining the reasons for the change in methodology);
Timken Co. v. United States, 2001 C.I.T. 96 (2001) (remanding several issues to
Commerce for redetermination); Davis v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 192 (2001) (holding

that the decision of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in interpreting "line
of duty" in the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act was unreasonable).
176.

50 Fed. CI. 192 (2001).

177. Id. at 197.
178. Id. at 204-06.
179. Id. at 204. "As these limitations demonstrate, Chevron deference is neither
automatic nor absolute. Before deferring to an agency's decision, a court should consider
these or other appropriate factors to determine if the circumstances of the case warrant
deference to the agency's statutory interpretation." Id. at 205 (citing United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
180. Id. at 204-06. Examples of the factors considered by the court include: whether
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these factors, picking several that weighed in favor of deference,181 but
finally coming out against deference due to that fact that the interpretive
question at issue was one of law, not fact.' 82 The ability to pick and
choose among an extensive list of factors weighing for or against
deference was one of the major problems with the indeterminacy of the
Skidmore test, as judges had no disincentive to act in a results-oriented
manner.183 After the history of the Chevron doctrine and the language in
Mead, this problem is compounded,
as the list of factors has only grown
84
since Mead was decided.
The possible indeterminacy of the Mead test is made more
troublesome when one considers that the Mead decision represents the
rebirth of the Skidmore test. If Justice Scalia is correct, and Skidmore is
an anachronism,' 85 then the confusion and results-oriented
decisionmaking that will occur as a result of the reemergence of the
Skidmore test will be worsened as a result of the inexperience of judges
in applying the test. One may argue that the determinacy problem in
Mead is not as dire as the recently decided cases after Mead might make
it seem. Courts are still coming to grips with the Mead test, and it is only
reasonable to expect that time would be needed to learn the test and have
the Supreme Court refine its application. However, history has shown
the difficulty with indeterminate, contextual tests, 86 and, even when
courts are experienced with Mead and Skidmore once again, there will be
little barrier against results-oriented decisionmaking under the correct
application of Skidmore.
Confusion is, unfortunately, the least of the problems after Mead.

the decision is "reasonable or logical"; whether "the decision involves a pure question of
law"; whether the "agency is . . . specifically charged with interpreting the statute";
whether "the agency's interpretation derives from an opinion letter, policy statement, or
other agency materials"; the agency's "expertise"; the consistency and longevity of [the
agency's] position" (keeping in mind that "[a]n agency is of course free to change its
interpretation of the statute"); whether the "interpretation involves avoidable
constitutional problems"; whether the agency's decisions "lack the force of law"; and
whether the agency's "regulatory scheme is technical and complex," among others. See
id at 204-05.
181. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) "is charged with applying the [statute].
To the court's knowledge, the BJA Director's interpretation of the [statutory language]
does not represent a shift in BJA policy. The decision also does not appear to create any
constitutional problems for the court to avoid." Id. at 206.
182. Id.
* 183. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
184. Along with the Skidmore and Chevron factors, courts can now include the Mead
factors, including, among others, whether the agency action has the force of law and
whether there are sufficient procedural protections attached to an agency action to protect
affected parties.
185. See supra text accompanying note 91.
186. See supranotes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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The second and most important result of Chevron 87 that Justice Scalia
feared had disappeared after Mead188 is the presumption of delegation
from Congress to agencies that operated to encourage judges to defer to
agency interpretations. It is important to study cases applying the Mead
test to try and determine whether this presumption will continue postMead, or whether the Mead counterrevolution will continueeliminating or perhaps even reversing the presumption favoring
deference by the judiciary to agency interpretations.
B.

The Transformation of Skidmore: Removing the Presumptionof
Deference to Agency Interpretations

The impact of confusion on those courts that are attempting to deal
with the new Mead test cannot be underestimated, as the difference
between affirmance of an agency action versus reversal or remand will
most probably lie in the Mead era in the court's decision of what level of
deference to apply. Just six months after the Mead decision was handed
down, the new Mead test had already been cited in sixty-nine federal
cases. 189 Of these sixty-nine cases, twenty-four applied Chevron
187. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
189. AI-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Bldg. Owners & Managers
Ass'n Int'l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 2356 (2002); Flynn v. Comm'r, 269 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Global Crossing
Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v.
Sec'y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267
F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Am.
Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001); Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d
1191 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. United States Forest Serv., 259
F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2001); Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir.); Hall
v. United States EPA, 263 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2001); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., Nos. 99-36035,
99-36078, 00-35310, 00-35524, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 29338 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001);
Cent. S.D. Coop Grazing Dist. v. Sec. of United States Dep't of Agric., 266 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2001); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th
Cir. 2001); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.
2001); U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001); Wisconsin v.
EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001); Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2001);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Pa., 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001); Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
2001); Morris v. Bus. Concepts, Inc., 259 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261
F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002); Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
No. 01-1469, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 5477 (Oct. 7, 2002); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States,
258 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of
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deference to the agency's interpretation (around thirty-five percent). 190
Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Pesquera Mares Australes, Ltda. v.
United States, 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States,
267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool
Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); SKF USA Inc. v. United
States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United
States, 273 F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Yanco v. United States, 258 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 921 (2002); United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer
Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Wilson-Coker,
175 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Conn. 2001); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C.
2001); Merck & Co., Inc. v. FDA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Tozzi v. EPA, 148
F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001); Viart v. Bull Motors, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla.
2001); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill.
2001); Pivot Point Int'l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001); St.
Luke's Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2001); United
States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2001); Mich. Pork
Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Campaign for Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637 (W.D. Mich.
2001); Hy-On-A-Hill Trout Farm, Inc. v. Glickman, 2001 DNH 137 (2001); Bonneville
Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); No Barriers, Inc. v. BRH Tex. GP,
L.L.C., No. 3:01-CV-0344-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2001);
Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Bostic v.
AT&T of theV.I., 166 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D.V.I. 2001); Bousa, Inc. v. United States, No.
90-12-00658, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 63 (Apr. 26, 2001); Carrini, Inc. v. United
States, No. 97-05-00845, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 97 (Aug. 2, 2001); Fujian Mach. &
Equip. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001);
Govesan Am. Corp. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001);
Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2001); Timken Co. v. United States, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade 96 (2001); Tung Mung Dev.
Co. v. United States, No. 99-07-00457, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 94 (July 3, 2001);
U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 2d 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); United
Techs. Corp. v. United States, No. 96-02-00635, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 155 (Dec.
13, 2001); Davis v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 192 (2001); Favreau v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 635 (2001); Vons Cos., Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1 (2001), modified, No.
00-234T, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 241 (Nov. 30, 2001); Lunsford v. Comm'r, 117 T.C.
159 (2001); N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 152 (2001).
These cases were obtained through a KeyCite of the Mead decision on
LexisNexis. In order to ensure that no cases were missed, a text cite of all federal cases
using the cite of the Mead decision was done in the "ALLFEDS" database on
LexisNexis.
190. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n Int'l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Flynn v. Comm'r, 269 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kaspar
Wire Works, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Am. Wildlands v.
Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001); Cent. S.D. Coop Grazing Dist. v. Sec. of
United States Dep't of Agric., 266 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001); Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d
741 (7th Cir. 2001); Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Pesquera Mares Australes, Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United
States, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Yanco v. United States, 258 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 921 (2002); United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer Towers, 152 F. Supp.
2d 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2001); Tozzi
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Of the twenty-four cases applying the Chevron test of deference, the
agency action was upheld in twenty-three of the decisions (around
ninety-six percent),' 9' with only one court remanding an action to the
agency. 92 It appears post-Mead that those agency actions that receive
Chevron deference have almost been predetermined to be deserving of
deference. These decisions provide evidence that the strong presumption
of deference that is implied in Chevron193 has continued to exist postMead, at least in the area of formal agency actions. However, cases postMead show that this presumption is not nearly as strong as it was in the
Chevron era, particularly in the area of informal agency actions.
Interestingly, one of the strongest as well as one of the most obvious
impacts of the Mead test is the revival of the Skidmore test. It is
somewhat startling how quickly and how powerfully the Skidmore test
has regained a foothold in administrative law in the post-Mead era. Of
the seventy decisions citing the Mead decision in the six months
following the Supreme Court's decision, twenty-nine (approximately
forty-one percent) used the Skidmore test of persuasiveness to determine
the amount of deference due to the agency's actions. 94 This number is
v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc.,
168 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Campaign for
Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters,
153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A. v. James, 184 F.
Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Tex. 2001); U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 2d 676
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Favreau v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 635 (2001); N.Y. Football
Giants, Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 152 (2001).
191. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n Int'l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Flynn v. Comm'r, 269 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kaspar
Wire Works, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Am. Wildlands v.
Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001); Cent. S.D. Coop Grazing Dist. v. Sec. of
United States Dep't of Agric., 266 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001); Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d
741 (7th Cir. 2001); Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Pesquera Mares Australes, Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of I11.Tool Works, Inc. v. United
States, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Yanco v. United States, 258 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 921 (2002); United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer
Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122
(D.D.C. 2001); Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001); Native Am. Arts, Inc.
v. Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. I11.2001); Mich. Pork Producers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Campaign for Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637 (W.D. Mich. 2001);
Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Wells Fargo Bank
Tex., N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Tex. 2001); U.S. Steel Group v. United
States, 162 F. Supp. 2d 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Favreau v. United States, 49 Fed. Cf.
635 (2001); N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 152 (2001).
192. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
193. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
194. Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Michigan v.
EPA, 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th
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significant, for it shows that, only six months after Mead, Skidmore had
already risen to a level of equality with Chevron in terms of use by the
courts. This is quite a change for an "anachronistic" decision which, in
the year prior to Christensen being decided by the Supreme Court,' 95 had
times concerning the issue of deference to agency
only been cited eleven
96
decisionmaking. 1
Cir. 2001); Hall v. EPA, 263 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1146 (9th
Cir. 2001); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., Nos. 9936035, 99-36078, 00-35310, 00-35524, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 29338 (9th Cir. Dec. 4,
2001); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir.
2001); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001);
U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001); Pool Co. v. Cooper,
274 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2001); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City
of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Morris v. Bus. Concepts, Inc., 259 F.3d 65
(2d Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); Heartland ByProds., Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, No. 01-1469,
2002 U.S. LEXIS 5477 (Oct. 7, 2002); Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y
of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United
States, 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Wilson-Coker, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 332 (D. Conn. 2001); Merck & Co., Inc. v. FDA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C.
2001); Viart v. Bull Motors, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Pivot Point Int'l
v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001); St. Luke's Methodist
Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2001); United States v. Nat'l
Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2001); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Bostic v. AT&T of the V.I., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 350 (D.V.I. 2001); Bousa, Inc. v. United States, No. 90-12-00658, 2001 Ct. Int'l
Trade LEXIS 63 (Apr. 26, 2001); Carrini, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-05-00845, 2001
Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 97 (Aug. 2, 2001); Govesan Am. Corp. v. United States, 167 F.
Supp. 2d 1374 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States,
182 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Tung Mung Dev. Co. v. United States, No.
99-07-00457, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 94 (July 3, 2001); United Techs. Corp. v.
United States, No. 96-02-00635, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 155 (Dec. 13, 2001).
195. The year prior to the date of decision of the Supreme Court's decision in
Christensen was an appropriate date to compare and contrast with the immediate effects
of Mead, as Christensen (as detailed above) represented the first step towards a
reintroduction of the Skidmore test for use in determining deference due to interpretive
rules. It is a precursor to Mead, and it would be difficult to say that the decisions of
courts after the Christensen case were a part of the Chevron era.
196. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Fazekas v. Cleveland Clinic Found. Health Care
Ventures Inc., 204 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2000); Herman v. Springfield Mass. Area, Local
497, Am. Postal Workers Union, 201 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Chessin v. Keystone Resort
Mgmt., Inc., 184 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 1999); Brooks v. Vill. of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d
130 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir.
1999); Herman v. Cont'l Grain Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Johnson v.
Guhl, 91 F. Supp. 2d 754 (D.N.J. 2000); Shannon v. Pleasant Valley Cmty. Living
Arrangements, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 426 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home
Health Care Servs., 76 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
These cases were found in a search on LexisNexis for Skidmore in the
ALLFEDS database between'the dates May 1, 1999, and May 1, 2000. The search
brought up as many, if not more, cases citing Skidmore as precedent for Fair Labor
Standards Act cases as cases citing Skidmore for deference due to an agency action. This
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If the courts applying the Skidmore test were doing so in a manner
that weighed the persuasiveness of the agency's actions, using the
various factors enunciated in Skidmore, then there should have been little
difference in result than those courts that had been applying Skidmore to
informal agency actions in the Chevron era. All that Mead would stand
for in terms of practical effects is yet another case identifying the
Supreme Court's position on the level of deference due to informal
agency actions. However, the cases show that the application of
Skidmore post-Mead is very different in nature and result than the
application of the test in the Skidmore or Chevron era.
Of the eleven cases citing Skidmore prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Christensen, the Skidmore test of persuasiveness was cited by
the majority in eight cases as an essential part of the court's decision
concerning deference. 197 Of these eight decisions, six (seventy-five
or gave deference
percent) upheld the agency's opinion under Skidmore
98
case.'
the
deciding
in
decision
to the agency's
The numbers are very different for those cases decided in the four
months following Mead. Of the twenty-nine cases citing Skidmore in the
context of the Mead test, only nine (around thirty-one percent) upheld the
agency's opinion.1 99 Of these nine cases, four affirmed the agency's
search obviously entails more subjectivity than the KeyCite search, as the author was
required to sift through the cases to determine which ones were relevant.
197. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Fazekas v. Cleveland
Clinic Found. Health Care Ventures Inc., 204 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2000); Herman v.
Springfield Mass. Area, Local 497, Am. Postal Workers Union, 201 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2000); Chessin v. Keystone Resort Mgmt., Inc., 184 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F.
Supp. 2d 754 (D.N.J. 2000); Shannon v. Pleasant Valley Cmty. Living Arrangements,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 426 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home Health Care
Servs., 76 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
The three cases left out of this group include Herman v. ContinentalGrain Co.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (suggesting in dicta that the Skidmore test is a
thing of the past), Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that majority should have applied the Skidmore test), and Brooks v.
Village of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing in footnote how
Skidmore should be applied in a way that gives great or decisive weight to agency
opinions).
198. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Fazekas v. Cleveland
Clinic Found. Health Care Ventures Inc., 204 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F. Supp. 2d
754 (D.N.J. 2000); Shannon v. Pleasant Valley Cmty. Living Arrangements, Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 426 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home Health Care Servs., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
199. Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2001); Student Loan Fund
of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., Nos. 99-36035, 99-36078, 00-35310, 0035524, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 29338 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001); Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2001); Morris v. Bus.
Concepts, 259 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Heartland By-Prods. v. United States, 264 F.3d
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decision in what can only be described as a coincidence that favored the
agency, as the court applied essentially de novo review in each case.2 °°
Thus, the number of courts that granted meaningful deference to the
agency's decision fell to five (around seventeen percent). 20 1
The percentage of cases deferring to agency action under Skidmore
looks even worse when one considers that, of the ten cases citing Mead
without applying either the Chevron or the Skidmore test,20 2 seven gave
no deference to the agency decision.20 3 The drop from seventy-five
percent to seventeen percent of decisions citing Skidmore and applying
deference to an agency's interpretation is significant, but the numbers in
a vacuum make it difficult to understand the change that has occurred in
terms of the approach of courts in applying the Skidmore doctrine. Two
examples from the six months following the decision in Mead help
1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Bostic v. AT&T of the V.I., 166 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D.V.I. 2001); Viart v. Bull
Motors, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fl. 2001); United Techs. Corp. v. United States,
No. 96-02-00635, 2001 Ct. Int'l. Trade LEXIS 155 (December 13, 2001).
200. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir.
2001) (upholding agency's action after doing an extensive search of the evidence in the
case, including legislative history); Morris v. Bus. Concepts, 259 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that even though it had already made a decision concerning the agency
interpretation through de novo review, the court "nevertheless take[s] comfort from the
Office's agreement with our interpretation of what copyright ownership means in the
context of collective work registrations"); Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (undertaking de novo review of interpretation of statutory
language prior to agreeing with agency); United Techs. Corp. v. United States, No. 9602-00635, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade, LEXIS 155 (December 13, 2001) (relying upon
"'[court's] own understanding of the terms used' in determining the correct
interpretation of the statutory language) (citing Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States,
847 F.2d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
201. Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2001); Heartland ByProds., Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Govesan Am. Corp. v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Viart v. Bull Motors, Inc.,
149 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fl. 2001); Bostic v. AT&T of the V.I., 166 F. Supp. 2d 350
(D.V.I. 2001).
202. A1-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268
F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2356 (2002); Qwest Corp. v. FCC,
258 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. United States Forest
Serv., 259 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2001); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1077
(Fed. Cir. 2001); No Barriers, Inc. v. BRH Tex. GP, L.L.C., No. 3:01-CV-0344-R, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2001); Fujian Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp.
Corp. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Timken Co. v.
United States, 2001 C.I.T. 96 (2001); Davis v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 192 (2001).
203. Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d
1191 (i0th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. United States Forest Serv., 259
F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2001); Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 273
F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Fujian Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Davis v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 192
(2001).
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reveal the new, weaker Skidmore standard of deference to agency
interpretations.
The first example of the weak level of Skidmore deference being
applied post-Mead is found in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York. 2° In this case, the Second Circuit
was trying to determine the meaning of "addition" in the Clean Water
Act in order to determine whether the City of New York had discharged
a pollutant into Esopus Creek. 20 5 The Second Circuit looked first to
whether the EPA's interpretation concerning dam releases as "additions"
deserved any deference from the court.206 In two prior opinions, courts
had given "substantial deference" to the litigation position of the EPA,
finding that the EPA's position was "reasonable. 20 7 Due to this level of
deference, given weight through court precedent, the EPA likely thought
that its position was relatively safe.20 8
Unfortunately for the EPA, it had not anticipated the Supreme
Court's decision in Mead. The Second Circuit saw the Mead decision as
a mandate to ignore prior precedent concerning informal interpretations
completely: "Given subsequent Supreme Court decisions governing
judicial deference to federal agencies' constructions of the statutes that
they implement, we hold that the EPA position is due less deference than
that accorded it by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts., 20 9 The
court went on to find that, after Mead, the interpretations advanced by
the EPA in litigation do not have the "force of law," and are therefore
undeserving of Chevron deference. 2
However, the court correctly
noted that the alternative to Chevron after Mead is not zero deference;
instead, the court decided it should evaluate the persuasiveness of the
EPA's position. 2 11 This was a meaningless victory for the EPA, as the
approach that the court took in evaluating the persuasiveness of the
EPA's interpretation did not depend on any Skidmore factors such as the
consistency and longevity of the interpretation. Rather, the court
undertook a de novo review using the tools of statutory interpretation,
focusing primarily on the text of the Clean Water Act but looking also at
purpose and legislative history.212 After this de novo review, the court
204. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
205. Id. at 489.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 490 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988)).
208. Id. at 489-90. Indeed, the EPA's position was admitted by the Second Circuit to
have been consistent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 490.
209. Id. at 490.
210. Id.at 491.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 491-94.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:2

decided that it did not find the Agency's "position to be persuasive. ,,213
No other mention of the Skidmore test or of the factors involved as a part
of this test was made by the court.
Catskill Mountains shows how certain courts in the post-Mead era
are taking an approach to Skidmore deference that is vastly different to
the weighing of factors approach that occurred in the Skidmore era and in
those cases citing Skidmore in the Chevron era. It appears that many
courts are now viewing Skidmore deference as a hollow doctrine that
requires little respect from courts.2 14 Skidmore deference has become no
deference, with courts undertaking a de novo review of agency action
once it has found Chevron inapplicable after the Mead inquiry. If after
this de novo review the court finds that its interpretation is consistent
with the agency's interpretation, then it grants deference.
But
"deference" is an inappropriate description of such an action. Instead,
the court's decision to uphold the agency's interpretation should be
characterized as a coincidence.
The second example of how post-Mead courts view Skidmore as a
different, weaker test is found in Navarro v. Pfizer Corp.21 5 In Navarro,
the court considered whether a mother could take a period of leave from
her employer under the Family Medical Leave Act in order to care for
her adult daughter, who was confined to a bed due to high blood pressure
while pregnant, and her daughter's children.2t 6 In ruling against the
mother, the district court relied "entirely" on an interpretive guidance
issued by the EEOC, granting Chevron deference to the agency
interpretation.27

The First Circuit, noting that only the Secretary of

Labor had authority to promulgate regulations under the act, overturned
the district court and ruled that it was error to grant Chevron deference to
an agency that had no authority to interpret the Family and Medical
Leave Act.21 8 Instead, the appellate court chose to apply Skidmore
deference under the "force of law" test established in Mead.2 19 The court
described the step down in Mead, when an agency interpretation fails the
l(a) or l(b) inquiry, to Skidmore as moving towards a "less tolerant

213. Id. at 491.
214. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649
(7th Cir. 2001); Morris v. Bus. Concepts, 259 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Nat'l Org. of
Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

215. 261 F.3d90 (1st Cir. 2001).
216. Id. at 93.
217. Id. at 98.
218.
219.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 98-99.
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standard., 220 The court understood the Supreme Court's language in
Mead to require little deference to informal actions even221before the court
began to look at the persuasiveness of the interpretation.
Just as interesting as its understanding of Skidmore is the court's
application of the Skidmore test. The court began by outlining the
language of the Skidmore persuasiveness test and quickly noted that the
guidance of the EEOC "does not fare well when measured against these
benchmarks. 222 The first reason given for the lack of persuasiveness by
the court is also the most interesting for the purpose of understanding the
lower level of deference given to informal agency actions post-Mead:
The agency action was promulgated in an informal format; therefore, it is
lacking in thoroughness and persuasiveness.22 3
This circular logic of the Navarro court presupposes a result for all
informal interpretations of statutes promulgated by agencies. The
interpretation does not deserve Chevron deference because it is in a form
specified by the Supreme Court in Mead to lie outside of the Mead test,
and, because the interpretation is promulgated in a form that does not
ensure procedural protections or long periods of notice and comment, it
fails the Skidmore test as well. While the court in Navarro did rely on
more traditional factors under Skidmore in addition to the form of the
interpretation, 224 its use of the circular reasoning explained above shows

the difficulty agencies will have post-Mead in arguing for deference to
its interpretations issued in more informal formats.
Navarro and Catskill are representative of how courts post-Mead
see the Skidmore test as requiring courts to grant little, if any, deference
to agency interpretations. It is hard to fault any court after Mead for
believing that the Skidmore test is a throw-away standard that permits
courts to engage in a strict, often de novo, review while paying lip
service to deference.
It is likely that lower courts have interpreted Mead as a signal from
the Supreme Court to significantly reverse the amount of deference
220. Id. at 99.
221. Id. at 98-99.
222. Id. at 99.
223. Id. at 100. The court quotes language from Christensen,later added to part 1(b)
of the Mead test, to show its distrust of the thoroughness of the agency interpretation:
"We can find no thoroughness evident in the consideration of the guidance. For one
thing, an interpretive guidance, much like 'interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines,' is not the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication." Id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000)).

224. The court also decided that the guidance was not meant to apply to language in
the Family and Medical Leave Act as it was promulgated prior to the passage of the Act.
Id. at 100. In addition, the court found that the interpretation clashed with the purpose of
the Act. Id.at 101.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:2

granted to agency decisionmaking. In their influential article, Law as
Equilibrium,22 5 Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey
discuss the theory of institutional interdependence and signaling, in
which the Supreme Court is able to costlessly 226 communicate in dicta
with other branches, such as Congress, to support a particular position or
viewpoint. 227 The Court can use its language and holdings to signal its
position on an issue to another branch, or it may simply be using
language to communicate to lower courts within its own branch. 228 The
theory of signaling helps explain the reaction of courts to the Mead test
in imposing a heightened standard of scrutiny for agency actions under
the Skidmore test.
In what was perhaps a prior signal by the Supreme Court, the test
constructed in Chevron concerning deference to agency decisionmaking
was viewed by commentators -and courts to be particularly deferential,
giving agencies wide room to interpret statutes, even through less formal
actions.22 9 While the revolutionary aspects of the Chevron decision are
debatable,230 there is no question that the language of the Supreme Court
in developing the Chevron test supported agency flexibility and
decisionmaking.23'
In Mead, the Supreme Court used language almost as powerful as
that in Chevron,232 but it used that language to encroach on the
supremacy and breadth of the Chevron decision. The Supreme Court in
Mead criticized agency flexibility,2 33 opposed deference to more
informal agency actions,234 and even developed a test to subsume the
Chevron decision as an inevitable choice (obviously different than the
225. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REv. 26 (1994).
226. Id. at 39-40 ("Signals contribute to the efficient operation of an institutional
system. Like bids in a game of bridge, signals are a relatively cheap way for cooperating
institutions to exchange preferences in the process of reaching the best contract or
deal.... Compared with formal overrides, signaling is also a less conflictual way for
lawmaking institutions to communicate with one another. Without actually striking down
federal legislation, the Supreme Court can lay out limitations on congressional authority
through dicta in constitutional opinions and narrow constructions of statutes that venture
close to constitutional boundaries.").
227. Id. at 39 ("Lawmaking institutions routinely send 'signals' to one anotherexpressions of preference that have no traditionally understood legal 'authority."').
228. Id. at 75 ("[T]he Court administers rewards and punishments (affirmances and
reversals) to lower courts, and these are signals as to how much more or less deferential
lower courts should be to agencies.").
229. See supra notes 46, 60-64, 71, 190-91 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part II.C.2.
233. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); see also supra note 125
and accompanying text.
234. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 234; see also supra text accompanying note 118.
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option chosen in Chevron) as to how to deal with the realities of the
administrative state.23 5 Such an encroachment on the primary framework
for judicial review of administrative decisionmaking could not have been
ignored by the lower courts in deciding how to approach the Mead test.
If the majority of courts read the signal in Mead as to the application of
Skidmore in an incorrect, overly stringent manner, it is only a result of
the reintroduction of Skidmore in the context of a decision pulling away
from a presumption of deference to agency interpretations of statutes.
The Mead decision shows a Court that was dissatisfied with the broad
reach of the Chevron decision and the resulting degree of deference
given to agencies. The clear signal in Mead is that the era of broad
deference should come to an end.
C.

The UncertainEvidence Concerningthe Future of Informal Agency
Interpretations

While the use of the now-weak Skidmore test has risen dramatically,
providing proof of a lesser degree of deference by the judiciary to agency
interpretations, it is still possible that the practical result of the Mead
decision will be for some judges to attempt to avoid using the Mead
inquiry altogether in an attempt to achieve a results-oriented decision. If
judges are able to avoid the test, it might mean that the practical effect of
the Mead decision is minor. One way to try and determine the overall
practical effect on the way that agencies act post-Mead would be to
examine the area of greatest flexibility in agency decisionmaking:
informal interpretations. The majority in Mead, in deciding on the
proper label for classification rulings, analogized the rulings to
interpretations contained in "policy statements, agency manuals, and
236
enforcement guidelines" all of which are beyond the "Chevron pale."
As this category of agency interpretations was the only one that the
Supreme Court majority definitively identified as undeserving of
Chevron deference, it would seem to follow that a comparison of the
treatment of these informal actions by courts pre- and post-Mead would
provide a good understanding of the degree to which Mead will affect the
nature of agency decisionmaking and the degree of deference given by
courts.
Six months prior to the date of the Christensen decision, there were
fifteen cases that examined opinion letters, policy statements, agency
manuals, or enforcement guidelines in the context of either Chevron or
Skidmore deference. 37 Of these fifteen decisions, twelve (eighty
235.
236.
237.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000); Fazekas v. Cleveland
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percent) upheld the agency interpretation contained in one of the
informal formats listed above. 238 This is a particularly high rate that one
would not expect considering the Supreme Court's move in the years
prior to Christensen to providing continuously
lower levels of deference
239
interpretations.
agency
to informal
In the six months after Mead, there is a definite drop in the rate of
affirmances of agency interpretations developed and promulgated
informally. In these six months, twenty cases examined opinion letters,
policy statements, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines in the
context of Skidmore, Chevron, Christensen or Mead deference. 240 Of
Clinic Found. Health Care Ventures Inc., 204 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2000); Michael C. ex rel.
Stephen C. v. Radnor Township Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 2000); Ass'n of Int'l
Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Jordan v. Sec'y of Educ., 194
F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Falken v. Glynn County, 197 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999); Melville v. Apfel,
198 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1999); Barajas v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 87 F. Supp.
2d 1201 (D. Kan. 2000); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, Civil No. 97-2068, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20670 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2000); In re Old Kent Mortgage Co. Yield Spread
Premium Litig., 191 F.R.D. 155 (D. Minn. 2000); Lee v. N.F. Invs., Inc., No. 4:99-CV426-ERW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20712 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2000); Shannon v. Pleasant
Valley Cmty. Living Arrangements, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 426 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Potchin v.
Prudential Home Mortgage Co., No. 97-CV-525, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22480
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999); Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home Health Care Servs., 76 F. Supp.
2d 805 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
These cases were identified by running an ALLFEDS search on the LexisNexis
database for Chevron, Skidmore, or opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, or
enforcement guidelines during November 1, 1999, to May 1, 2000 (the date of the
Christensendecision).
238. Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000); Fazekas v. Cleveland
Clinic Found. Health Care Ventures Inc., 204 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2000); Michael C. ex rel.
Stephen C. v. Radnor Township Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 2000); Falken v. Glynn
County, 197 F.3d 1341 (11 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200
F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999); Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1999); Barajas v.
Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 2000); In re Old Kent
Mortgage Co. Yield Spread Premium Litig., 191 F.R.D. 155 (D. Minn. 2000); Lee v. N.F.
Invs., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-426-ERW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20712 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15,
2000); Shannon v. Pleasant Valley Cmty. Living Arrangements, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 426
(W.D. Pa. 2000); Potchin v. Prudential Home Mortgage Co., No. 97-CV-525, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22480 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999); Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home Health Care
Servs., 76 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
239. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
240. FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Klinedinst v. Swift Invs., Inc., 260 F.3d 1251 (1lth Cir. 2001); Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2001); Matz
v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Bejjani v. INS,
271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001); Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001);
Cunningham v. Scibana, 259 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2001); Catskill Mountains Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Navarro v.
Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp.
Comm'n, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Hanson v. United Life Ins. Co., 170 F.
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these twenty cases, ten (fifty percent) provided some deference to an
agency's interpretation. 241 While this figure represents a significant
decrease in affirmances of agency interpretations from the rate prior to
Christensen, it is not as dramatic a drop in affirmances as the one seen in
a comparison of courts applying the Skidmore standard of deference.242
In fact, this number seems to be what one might expect after Mead, given
the Supreme Court's express desire for courts to review informal
interpretations under a lower standard of deference. These figures could
therefore serve as a small amount of evidence that the effect of Mead
was merely to shift informal interpretations to a lesser standard of
Skidmore deference.
However, the figures listed above include all decisions concerning
informal agency interpretations, not only those decisions that examined
such interpretations in the context of the Mead decision. When the cases
of
are limited to those citing Mead while attempting to decide the level 243
deference'to apply to such interpretations, only nine decisions remain.
Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Hartman v. Lisle Park Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D.
Ill. 2001); St. Luke's Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa
2001); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Tex. 2001); S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Utah 2001);
Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Tung Mung
Dev. Co. v. United States, No. 99-07-00457, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 94 (July 3,
2001).
These cases were obtained through an ALLFEDS search on the LexisNexis
database for Chevron, Skidmore, Mead, or Christensen and opinion letters, policy
statements, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines in the period starting June 18,
2002 (the date of Mead), and ending on December 18, 2002.
241. FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Klinedinst v. Swift Invs., Inc., 260
F.3d 1251 (11 th Cir. 2001); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld,
262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2001); Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001);
Cunningham v. Scibana, 259 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2001); Am. Express Co. v. United States,
262 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hanson v. United Life Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 966
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D.
Tex. 2001); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp 2d 1130
(D. Utah 2001); Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
242. Compare the fifty-eight percent difference in percentage of affirmances in cases
citing Skidmore prior to Christensen and post-Mead (seventy-five percent priorseventeen percent post) with the thirty percent difference in percentage of affirmances in
cases dealing with informal agency interpretations prior to Christensen and post-Mead
(eighty percent prior-fifty percent post). See supra notes 197-201, 238-41 and
accompanying text.
243. FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649
(7th Cir. 2001); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.
2001); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); St. Luke's
Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Orthopedic
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Of these nine decisions, six (around sixty-seven percent) disagreed with
the agency interpretation when issued in one of the informal formats
244
identified by the court in Mead as undeserving of Chevron deference.
Thus, when the Mead test is applied to agency interpretations without
formal protections, it appears that there is little deference given. The
difference between these percentages provides evidence that courts postMead are either hesitant to use the Mead test in the context of an
informal agency interpretation, as they are aware that the test tends to
funnel reviewing courts in the direction of no deference for informal
interpretations, or that there is a bit of lag time that can be anticipated
before the majority of courts begin to use the Mead test. If the latter is
the correct interpretation, it is likely that the thirty-three percent rate of
affirmances is more representative of a future trend than the fifty percent
figure.
The result of this evidence, although limited in number due to the
recent nature of the Mead decision, seems to support Justice Scalia's
lament in dissent in Mead about the threat to the future of informal
agency actions (such as informal adjudications), which in turn threatens
agency flexibility:
Since informal rulemaking and formal adjudication are the only
more-or-less safe harbors from the storm that the Court has
unleashed; and since formal adjudication is not an option but must be
mandated by statute or constitutional command; informal
rulemaking-which the court was once careful to make voluntar
24 5
unless required by statute ... will now become a virtual necessity.
Agencies after Mead, if the numbers above are sufficient to serve as a
prediction of future trends, run a high risk of reversal when issuing
interpretations through an informal method. A review of informal
agency actions before and after Mead again provides proof that the
background presumption of deference to agencies in Chevron has been
reversed.
Lower federal courts are reading Mead to require a lower level of
deference to agency interpretations, particularly in the context of
Skidmore deference. Interpretations examined under the Skidmore test, if
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Tung Mung Dev. Co. v.
United States, No. 99-07-00457, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 94 (July 3, 2001).
244. Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001);
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); St. Luke's Methodist
Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Tung Mung Dev. Co. v.
United States, No. 99-07-00457, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 94 (July 3, 2001).
245. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the numbers in the six months post-Mead are any indication of an
established trend, are likely to be upheld only in the coincidence that the
interpretations agree with the result reached by a court after de novo
review of a statute.24 6 This result, when compared to those cases
applying Skidmore or reviewing informal interpretations during the
Chevron era, show that the background presumption of deference to
agency decisionmaking established in Chevron247 has been limited or
entirely removed by the Supreme Court in Mead.
IV. Why Was a Counterrevolution Needed?
The main focus of this paper has been to determine whether the
Mead decision represents a fundamental shift in administrative law,
similar in impact to the Skidmore or Chevron decisions. Regardless of
the outcome of this question, however, it is clear that the Supreme Court
majority in Mead did feel a need to articulate a new standard of review of
agency interpretations and decisionmaking, even if this new standard
meant only to codify the Court's building reluctance to defer to
interpretations by agencies that lack the procedural protections of notice
and comment or formal adjudication. At least one reason for this new
standard can be seen within the language of the majority in Mead: a
desire to limit the growing, unprincipled delegation by Congress to
agencies that was facilitated by a judiciary resting its bases for deference
on a fiction of delegation through ambiguity.
In its purest form, the nondelegation doctrine, from its roots in the
principle of separation of powers, 248 has been understood by judges and
commentators to require that the legislature not cede its legislative power
to another branch or independent entity. 249 However, from the beginning
of the doctrine's existence, there has been a tension between the growth
of a burgeoning administrative state and the desire to contain all actions
affecting the legal rights of individuals within the hands of elected
representatives.2 50 The more the administrative state grew, the less
246. See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 60-64 and accompanying text.
248. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 479 (1989) ("If the legislature were
permitted to transfer its power to another part of government, the Constitution's efforts to

render governmental power safe by dividing it among discrete power centers could be
easily frustrated. Hence, to the extent that the nondelegation doctrine is called upon to
help enforce the structural commitment to separation of powers, its principal focus is the
movement of power: is the authority of one branch being transferred to another, which
will now possess a dangerous concentration of government power?").
249. See Farina, supra note 248, at 478; see also Royce C. Lamberth, Reflections on
Delegation in the Chevron Era, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 11, 14 (2001).
250. See Farina, supra note 2488, at 479 ("The size and power of the contemporary
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capable Congress was of handling the incapacitatingly large amount of
bureaucratic work required to maintain such a system. 251
Thus, the
growth of agency power can be seen as a variable in the decline of the
viability of the nondelegation doctrine, coming to a heyday in Chevron.
. Commentators have noted that the Chevron case is, at its core, a
decision about the level of delegation from Congress to agencies that is
constitutionally allowable.252 The decision has been so characterized
because of the nature of the Chevron test. The Chevron inquiry looks for
ambiguity in the absence of express congressional intent and makes an
arguably bright-line decision concerning deference.25 3 Essentially, the
decision establishes a presumption that, when Congress has not expressly
spoken on the issue, Congress has delegated its ability to speak to the
agency. Even if the presumption was not intended by the Supreme Court
to be so strongly worded, a more critical judge analyzing ambiguity in a
statute under step one who decides to take the power to interpret away
from the agency is still making a delegation decision: Congress has not
delegated the power to speak in this instance. Thus, the Chevron
decision, in addition to being the central decision in administrative law,
has the distinction of being a major decision against nondelegation as
well.
After Chevron, courts were deferring to agency interpretations due
administrative state became doctrinally possible because the Supreme Court's view of the
scope and purpose of constitutional restraints on delegation evolved considerably during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."); id. at 497 ("The development of the
administrative state strained the limits of even this most flexible [separation of powers]
model's capacity to accommodate change."); see also Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2072
("The incompatibility of law and administration was a prominent theme during the 1920s
and the New Deal period, which produced a fundamental reformation in the structure of
American constitutionalism. Indeed, the creation of the administrative state was largely a
self-conscious repudiation of legalism.").
251. The need for a semi-autonomous administrative state to relieve Congress of an
overwhelming workload was also a prominent theme in Chevron. See Lamberth, supra
note 249, at 13 ("[Chevron] reinforces, both in theory and practice, the post-New Deal
administrative state that we live with today. Many aspects of our nation make this 'fourth
branch'-as some have called it-almost a necessity. The United States is a
geographically large nation, with millions of racially diverse citizens. There are
advanced transportation systems, financial markets, and personal technology. Given
these characteristics, it is ridiculous to think that the 535 individuals on Capitol Hill can
regulate all of this effectively."). The need-for-broad-delegation theme is also a main
argument of those on the side of those favoring expertise over accountability in the
popular current debate.
252. See Farina, supra note 248, at 498 ("The choice between deference and
independent judgment is, at bottom, a choice between whether this authority will further
swell agency power or will instead help to counterbalance it."); see also Lamberth, supra
note 249, at 13 ("At its heart, Chevron is really a doctrine of delegation."); Sunstein,
supra note 46, at 2090 ("[T]he Chevron approach might be understood as the best
reconstruction of legislative instructions on the question of deference.").
253. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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to the mere absence of congressional intent, not as a result of express
congressional instructions to do so. This decision held the possibility of
allowing a large amount of unprincipled delegation, as courts were
allowing deference based on the fiction that congressional silence
represented a desire to delegate. 4 As one commentator noted, the
Chevron decision may in fact have driven "the last 25nail
in the
5
sporadically reopened casket of the nondelegation doctrine.,
Chevron empirically appears to be a decision that cries out for
restraint under the nondelegation doctrine. However, in the Supreme
Court's eyes, the doctrine appears to be a thing of the past. 6 Thus,
when the Supreme Court began to cut back on the most unprincipled
examples of deference, such as opinion letters and agency positions in
adjudications, it was not willing to base its decisions on a declining
nondelegation doctrine. Instead, the Supreme Court found a backdoor
response to unprincipled congressional delegation of lawmaking powers
to agencies: cutting back on the broad reach of Chevron in the lower
courts.
The Supreme Court recognized in Mead that its decision was a
dramatic change in its approach to congressional delegation of
decisionmaking:
Underlying the position we take here.... is a choice about the best
way to deal with an inescapable feature of the body of congressional
legislation authorizing administrative action. That feature is the great
variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government's
administrative arms with discretion, and with 2procedures for
exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress.
The choice that was made in Mead concerns the level of legislative
254. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
255. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
FederalStatutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 834 (1991).
256. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (overturning a
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision invalidating a judgment by the EPA as a
violation of the nondelegation doctrine, one of the only recent cases to give the doctrine
life); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOzO L. REV. 989, 990 (1999) ("[I]t... must be acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court continues to show 'no interest in reviving the delegation doctrine as a
check on administrative discretion."') (citing POCHARD PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS 54 (2d ed. 1992)); see also Lamberth, supra note 249, at 14-15 (noting
that the last case "expressly relying on the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a statute
was Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, decided in 1935" and describing the burst of
energy given the statute by the American Trucking decision as now merely a
"sentiment"); Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2111 (describing how the Supreme Court no
longer enforces the nondelegation doctrine and describing this lax enforcement as part of
the doctrine's "downfall").
257. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235-36 (2001).
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power that the Supreme Court deems is acceptable for Congress to
delegate. The choice was to limit the reach of Chevron and thus limit
unprincipled delegation. 8 This limitation on delegation can be seen in
the language and approach of the Mead test itself. The l(a) and l(b)
inquiries in the Mead test are separate ways of achieving the same goalrequiring explicit congressional delegation to agencies to make rules
with the "force of law., 259 As Justice Scalia notes in dissent in Mead, the
focus of courts post-Mead will not be the ambiguous language of the
statute that the agency is interpreting, but rather the explicit delegation of
lawmaking authority by Congress to an agency. 260 Even if courts find a
general delegation to the agency to make rules with the "force of law"
under 1(a), the agency action must still have sufficient procedural
protections to satisfy the l(b) inquiry.26 1 The new presumption postMead is that there is no authority to issue rulings that have the force of
law unless Congress has given explicit signs that the agency has such
authority.
While this reasoning is drawn purely from implicit hints in the
Supreme Court's decision in Mead, it explains the fear of informal
interpretations. While the Supreme Court cannot prevent Congress from
delegating power under the nondelegation doctrine, it can at least protect
regulated entities from the arbitrary, informal, or inconsistent actions of
lower-level agency actors. These least principled actions are eliminated
post-Mead, particularly with the low level of deference given under the
new Skidmore inquiry that courts engage in post-Mead.
V.

Conclusion

Mead is a dramatic decision, even if its impact is limited to the
revival of a new form of Skidmore deference for informal agency
interpretations. The Mead decision has quickly become one of the most
cited decisions in administrative law,262 and it will be studied extensively

258. Several commentators saw the Supreme Court's ability to limit (or reinterpret)
the reach of the test in Chevron as a means to control unprincipled delegation long before
the Mead decision. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 256, at 992 (acknowledging that
the nondelegation doctrine could not be realistically enforced due to the realities of the
administrative state and recommending as an alternative approach limiting the reach of
Chevron deference to control delegation and deference); Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2112
(noting that an aggressive judicial role in step one of Chevron can serve as a surrogate to
nondelegation).
259. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
261. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
262. In the six months following Mead, the decision had already been cited sixty-nine
times. See sources cited supra note 189. Considering the relatively short life of the
decision, its citation should only increase.
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in the years to come. The practical effect of the Mead decision on the
actions of agencies should be studied further. In significantly limiting
the ability of agencies to interpret statutory language through informal
actions, such as ruling letters, amicus briefs, and other forms, Mead
limits one of the primary tools of agency action.2 63 Post-Mead, if an
agency wants its understanding of a statute to be given any level of
deference, it will be forced to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication. This result, if it bears out, will significantly slow
down administrative decisionmaking, and may, in the end, have a
negative effect on the administrative state as a whole.
What this possible outcome and the precedential effect of Mead
show is that the Supreme Court's decision is a significant one in the
course of administrative law in the line of Skidmore and Chevron that
will come to be as studied and discussed as its predecessors. In order for
informal agency interpretations to receive any deference at all, it will be
up to the Supreme Court to signal to lower courts the proper level of
deference to be given under Skidmore. Unfortunately, it is still open to
question whether the Court will be willing to do so.
This question represents the greatest problem in the aftermath of the
Mead decision: a Supreme Court that has decided to leave a question
fundamental to the functioning of the administrative state in the hands of
lower court judges who may come to hundreds of different decisions on a
sliding scale of Skidmore deference. The Supreme Court must end the
confusion that currently reigns in the lower courts by clarifying the
proper approach to the Mead test and the proper level of deference to be
given under Skidmore. Even if the result of the clarification is the
elimination of deference to informal agency interpretations, the resulting
clarity and predictability would at least allow agencies to plan their first
steps into this new era, mourning all the while the passing of Chevron.

263. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 1109-10 ("Agencies publish far more statements in
the form of opinion letters, guidelines and policy memoranda... than statements through
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking .... ").

